

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32

18 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session

New York, 7-18 April 1997

Report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session

I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its fifty-first session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 51/45 A of 10 December 1996, took note of the decision of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, following appropriate consultations, to hold the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee in New York from 7 to 18 April 1997.

2. Accordingly, the first session of the Preparatory Committee was opened on 7 April, by Mr. Evgeniy Gorkovskiy, Officer-in-Charge and Deputy Director of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs of the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat.

3. The following 149 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons participated in the work of the Preparatory Committee at its first session: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia and Zimbabwe.



4. The Preparatory Committee held 15 meetings, of which summary records were provided for the opening meeting (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.1), the general debate (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.2-3) and the closing meetings (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.13, 15) in accordance with the Committee's decision. The summary records are issued separately as annex I to the present report.

5. Mrs. Hannelore Hoppe, Senior Political Affairs Officer of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs, served as Secretary of the Committee. Mr. Mohamed Elbaradei, Assistant Director General for External Relations, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna; Mr. Berhanykun Andemicael, Representative of the Director General of IAEA to the United Nations in New York; Ms. Merle Opelz, Head, IAEA Office at Geneva; and Ms. Jan Priest, Head, Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Policy Section, Division of External Relations, IAEA, Vienna, represented the Agency.

II. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee

6. With regard to the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the presidency of the 2000 Review Conference, an understanding had been reached among delegations, according to which a representative of the Western Group should be proposed to chair the first session, a representative of the Group of Eastern European States should be proposed to chair the second session, a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to chair the third session and a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty should be proposed for the presidency of the 2000 Review Conference. All groups were encouraged to propose the representatives for the chairmanship of the various sessions of the Preparatory Committee and for the presidency of the 2000 Review Conference at their earliest possible convenience.

7. Pursuant to that understanding, Mr. Pasi Patokallio (Finland), the representative of the Western Group, was proposed to chair the first session. At its first meeting, on 7 April, the Committee unanimously elected Mr. Patokallio to serve as Chairman of the first session. At its 15th meeting, on 18 April, the Committee also decided that Mr. Tadeusz Strulak (Poland), the representative of the Group of Eastern European States, would be the Chairman of its second session. It was also decided that when not serving as Chairman, the Chairmen of the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee would serve as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee. It was further decided that a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be proposed to serve as Vice-Chairmen of the second session.

8. At its first meeting, on 7 April, the Committee adopted the following agenda (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/1/Rev.1):

1. Opening of the session.
2. Election of the Chairman.
3. Adoption of the agenda.
4. Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
5. Organization of work of the Preparatory Committee:
 - (a) Election of officers;
 - (b) Dates and venues for further sessions;
 - (c) Methods of work:
 - (i) Decision-making;
 - (ii) Participation;
 - (iii) Working languages;
 - (iv) Records and documents;
 - (v) Consideration of ways and means.
6. Reports on substantive and procedural issues, recommendations to the next session of the Preparatory Committee and draft recommendations to the Review Conference.
7. Organization of the 2000 Review Conference:
 - (a) Dates and venue;
 - (b) Draft rules of procedure;
 - (c) Election of the President and other officers;
 - (d) Appointment of the Secretary-General;
 - (e) Provisional agenda;
 - (f) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee;
 - (g) Background documentation;
 - (h) Final document(s).

8. Adoption of the final report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference.
9. Any other matters.
9. In the course of the discussion of agenda item 5 on the organization of work of the Preparatory Committee, the following decisions were taken:

(a) Dates and venues of further sessions

At its 15th meeting, the Committee provisionally agreed, subject to further consultations by the Chairman, that the second session would be held from 27 April to 8 May 1998 in Geneva and that the third session would take place from 12 to 23 April 1999 in New York.

(b) Methods of work

(i) Decision-making

At its first meeting, on 7 April, the Committee decided to make every effort to adopt its decisions by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the Committee would then take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis.

(ii) Participation

At its first meeting, on 7 April, the Committee decided that:

- Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled, at their own expense, to submit documents to the participants in the Committee. Accordingly, representatives of the following States not parties to the Treaty attended the meetings of the Committee as observers: Brazil, Cuba, Israel and Pakistan.
- Representatives of specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled, at their own expense, to submit documents to the participants in the Committee. Accordingly, the following regional intergovernmental organization was represented as an observer at the meetings of the Committee: South Pacific Forum.
- Representatives of non-governmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the public gallery, to receive

documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee would also make time available at each session, during which the non-governmental organizations could make presentations. Accordingly, representatives of 113 non-governmental organizations attended the meetings of the Committee.

(iii) Working languages

Also at its first meeting, the Committee decided to use Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish as its working languages.

(iv) Records and documents

At its 6th meeting, on 10 April, the Committee decided that summary records would be provided at each session of the Committee's opening meeting, the general debate and the closing meetings. There would be records of decisions taken at the other meetings.

10. The Committee set aside two meetings for a general debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee, in the course of which 38 statements were made. The statements are reflected in the summary records of those meetings (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.2-3).

11. The Committee held a total of 9 meetings for a substantive discussion under agenda item 4 entitled "Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". In doing so, the Committee used as a basis for a structured discussion the three sets of issues (clusters) contained in annex V to the Final Report of the Preparatory Committee to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/1).

12. During the session, the Committee had before it the following documents:

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/1 and Rev.1

Agenda

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/2

Statement by the delegations of France, China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament at the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/3

Cluster one: article VI, submitted by New Zealand

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/4

Cluster one, submitted by Canada

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NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/5

Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by Egypt on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States that are parties to the Treaty

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/6

Letter received on 10 April 1997 from the Russian Federation and the United States of America addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, transmitting the joint statements from the March 1997 Summit Meeting between the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, held in Helsinki

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/7

Cluster two, submitted by Canada

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/8

Cluster two: article VII, submitted by New Zealand

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/9

Some possible elements to be taken into account in the review process, submitted by Japan

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/10

Letter dated 10 April 1997 from the Chairman of the Working Group on Disarmament of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/11

General considerations to be taken into account by parties in the review process, submitted by the Marshall Islands

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/12

Cluster two: nuclear-weapon-free zones, submitted by Mongolia

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/13

Cluster one: transparency measures, submitted by Norway

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/14

Cluster two: article VII, submitted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/15
Proposals for inclusion in the report on the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by China
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/16 and Corr.1
Draft protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, submitted by Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/17
Cluster one: nuclear disarmament, submitted by Ireland
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/18
Cluster three, submitted by Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/19
Cluster two: nuclear-weapon-free zones, submitted by Belarus
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/20
Cluster one: nuclear disarmament, submitted by Sweden
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/21
Proposals for inclusion in the report on the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by the Russian Federation
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/22
Proposals for inclusion in the report on the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by South Africa
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/23
Draft recommendations for the report on the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, submitted by the European Union
- NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/24
Non-proliferation and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards: statement by France

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/25	Cluster three, submitted by Canada
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/26	Nuclear disarmament: statement by France
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/27	Implementation of article IV: statement by France
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/28	Cluster three: conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses, submitted by Norway
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/29	Views on a "rolling document" for the strengthened Treaty review process, submitted by Canada
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/30	Clusters one, two and three, submitted by Australia
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/31	Chairman's statement
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/CRP.1	Draft report of the Preparatory Committee on its first session
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/DEC.1	Record of decision
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/INF.3	List of participants
NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.1-3, 13, 15	Summary records

13. A list of the delegations to the Preparatory Committee, including States parties, observer States, specialized agencies and regional intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, is contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/INF.3.

B. Organization of the 2000 Review Conference

14. The Preparatory Committee, in conformity with its task to prepare for the 2000 Review Conference, considered issues contained in agenda item 7. It took the following actions:

(a) Dates and venue of the Conference

At its 15th meeting, on 18 April, the Committee provisionally agreed, subject to further consultations by the Chairman, that the Review Conference would be held from 24 April to 19 May 2000 in New York.

(b) Appointment of the Secretary-General

The Committee decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with the members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2000 Review

Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a nomination which would later be confirmed by the Conference itself.

(c) Financing of the Review Conference, including its Preparatory Committee

The Committee decided to request the Secretariat to provide for its second session an estimate of the costs of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its preparation.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEXT SESSION OF THE
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

15. During the course of the session, the Chairman held a number of informal consultations in the process of which delegations put forward their views and proposals on recommendations to the next session of the Preparatory Committee and on draft recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. As a result of those consultations, the Chairman put forward a working paper which is annexed to the present report (annex II). The Committee recommended that at its second session the official documents and other proposals submitted by delegations during the first session of the Preparatory Committee as contained in annex II (para. 4 and the appendix) will be taken into account during further work on draft recommendations to the Review Conference and also the working paper submitted by the Chairman which will be interpreted in the light of the official documents and other proposals made by delegations as contained in annex II (para. 4 and the appendix).

16. The Committee recommended that at its second session, it should continue the consideration of all aspects of the Treaty in a structured and balanced manner, in accordance with agenda item 4 entitled "Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

17. Following approval of paragraph 16, the Chairman made a formal statement which is contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/31.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review

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CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

It is understood that within the existing agenda and in accordance with the methods of work adopted at the first session, the Committee also recommended that time should be allocated at the second session for the discussion on and the consideration of any proposals on the following subject areas, without prejudice to the importance of other issues:

- Security assurances for parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- The resolution on the Middle East;
- The provision in paragraph 4 (b) of the principles and objectives on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

It is noted that there was no objection to my making this statement.

Annex I

SUMMARY RECORDS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

[To be distributed individually as NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/SR.1-3 and SR.13, 15]

Annex II

CHAIRMAN'S WORKING PAPER

1. The first session of the Preparatory Committee began the process of reviewing the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
2. In the course of this process, the specific proposals listed in paragraph 4 below were put forward by delegations as a basis for recommendations to be made by the Preparatory Committee to the Review Conference to be held in 2000.
3. At this stage, there was general agreement, subject to review and updating at subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee, and pending final agreement on all draft recommendations at the last session, on the following points:

Reaffirmation of commitment to the preamble and the articles of the Treaty,

Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as reaffirmation of the decisions on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the review process for the Treaty as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

(i) Universality

Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome for the eight new accessions to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 186; urgency for all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

(ii) Main Committee I issues

Non-proliferation

Reaffirmation that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament

The importance of all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in accordance with article XIV of that Treaty.

Reaffirmation of the need for immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

Recognition of the progress in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the START process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament; reaffirmation of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons and of the commitment by all States to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Welcome for the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995 and reaffirmation of the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned enhances global and regional peace and security.

Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok to establishing a mechanism for cooperation among their respective Treaty agencies.

Security assurances

Reaffirmation of the view that further steps, which could take the form of an international legally binding instrument, should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(iii) Main Committee II issues

Safeguards

Welcome for the conclusion of negotiations on the IAEA 93+2 programme to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system and expectation that IAEA will endorse that outcome at its special session in May; reaffirmation that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements.

(iv) Main Committee III issues

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

Reaffirmation of commitment to continue to take further steps for the full realization of the relevant provisions of the Treaty, taking into account the undertakings in the principles and objectives on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. The following is a list of the specific proposals put forward by delegations for consideration by the Preparatory Committee on the understanding that the proposals are without commitment by the Preparatory Committee and without prejudice to the position of any delegation, and that the list is not exclusive and delegations are free to submit new proposals or modify or withdraw old ones at any further session of the Preparatory Committee:

(Chapeau)

- The Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The international community should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
- It is important for the States parties to reconfirm the crucial role of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The States parties should reconfirm that the stability of the Treaty regime is essential to the maintenance of world peace and security.
- The decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constitute a single integral undertaking. This integrality should be maintained and respected.
- The States parties reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty as well as efforts designed to promote the full realization and effective and indiscriminate implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty and the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
- The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons attending the first session of the Preparatory Committee for

the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirm the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The States parties reaffirm the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

- The resolution on the Middle East

It should be noted that no progress has been achieved in the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Preparatory Committee meetings should follow up on the implementation of the provisions of the resolution with a view to reporting to the Review Conference on the progress achieved in this regard.

Since the adoption of the resolution, new realities have emerged in the Middle East pertaining to adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. With the latest accession of the United Arab Emirates, Djibouti and Oman, it is now a reality that all States of the Middle East have become parties to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries are convinced that the implementation of this resolution should proceed as soon as possible with a view to enhancing the universality of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. In this regard, the meetings of the Preparatory Committee should welcome the latest accessions to the Treaty and call upon Israel to accede to it without further delay as well as to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee should recommend ways and means to get all parties directly concerned to engage seriously in undertaking practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, a zone which should be freely arrived at among regional States.

The depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a special responsibility in this regard, as co-sponsors of the draft resolution submitted for adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and as the resolution constitutes part and parcel of the package of the outcome composed of three decisions and the resolution.

- (i) Universality

- The States parties welcome the eight recent accessions to the Treaty. Universal adherence to the Treaty remains an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to it at

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the earliest date. The States parties will make determined efforts to achieve this objective.

- We welcome the recent accessions to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which strengthen it and reaffirm the urgency of universal adherence.

We invite all States not yet party to the Treaty to review and revisit their positions, especially in view of the now near universal adherence to the Treaty.

- All States parties should strive for the achievement of the universality of the Treaty.
- The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasize the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty.

The Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conference should consider ways and means to achieve the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities.

- To be updated and further developed at the second session of the Preparatory Committee.
- Great progress has been made towards the ultimate goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The States parties should unite their efforts to encourage States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it as soon as possible. It would be useful to promote dialogue and confidence-building among the countries concerned so as to improve their regional security environment.
- Recognizing that universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent requirement, the States parties recommend that all States parties should make every effort to achieve this objective, and call on all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded facilities.
- The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should redouble their efforts to achieve the universality of the Treaty because the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament are one of the cornerstones of international peace and security.
- Supporting efforts already made to achieve universality, the States parties call for further measures to enhance opportunities to achieve universality, and insist on a balance in the treatment of the universality issue.

(ii) Main Committee I issues

Non-proliferation

- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The international community should make all possible efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.
- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The States parties should pursue and agree on all possible and necessary measures and efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
- The States parties should continue to promote the full implementation of the non-proliferation obligations of the nuclear-weapon States and of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The States parties should continue to take active measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the technologies, material and equipment that are used to produce those weapons, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially by developing countries.

- The States parties welcome the implementation of the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and support the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions and cooperation from Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Nuclear disarmament

- The States parties welcome the adoption and opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as an indispensable step forward on the path to nuclear disarmament, and as the fulfilment of a principal component of the decision of the 1995 Conference on principles and objectives. The Treaty establishes a norm against nuclear testing, which is reflected in its signature by more than 140 States. All States parties aim to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date, as a demonstration of the strength of international support for the Treaty and in order to facilitate its entry into force at the earliest possible time.

The States parties renew their commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special

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Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

- We welcome the joint statement by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki on 21 March 1997 committing to the commencement of negotiations on a START III agreement, immediately once START II enters into force, which would establish, by 31 December 2007, lower aggregate levels of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads, possible reductions in tactical nuclear systems and other measures to promote the irreversibility of these deep reductions.

The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expect these commitments to be realized as soon as possible.

We call upon other nuclear-weapon States to commit immediately to not increasing their inventories and to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations among the five, in parallel with START III.

We call on all States to make the utmost efforts to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through all means possible up to and including the Conference of the States Parties to be held in 1999.

We emphasize that article 5 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referring to peaceful nuclear explosions, has been redefined and overtaken under the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

We recognize the decisive role that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty plays in preventing the development of new nuclear weapons and the modernization of existing ones. We look to the nuclear-weapon States to signal their unequivocal support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force, by declaring their intention never again to conduct nuclear explosions.

We look to the earliest possible commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament towards a fissile material cut-off convention, on the basis of the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

Pending conclusion of such a convention, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to affirm or reaffirm, as the case may be, their commitment to forever cease production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Determined efforts should be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and to place more of such material under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

- The nuclear-weapon States concerned should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence; the States with large nuclear arsenals should

further reduce drastically their nuclear stockpiles, and should destroy the removed nuclear warheads rather than simply transfer them from deployment to storage.

All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and to conclude a legally binding international instrument to that effect.

No country should develop and deploy space weapon systems or missile defence systems that undermine strategic security and stability.

States with nuclear weapons deployed outside their borders should bring all these weapons home.

The States that have not yet signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty are urged to do so at an early date, and all signatory States should strive to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty.

All States should work for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

An international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons under effective international supervision should be concluded through negotiations with the participation of all States.

- The States parties would support the objective of increased transparency regarding short-range nuclear weapons in the context of its recommendations on nuclear disarmament.
- The States parties should agree on a recommendation to the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would take into account the proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt a flexible approach, taking into account their commitment, as stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good

faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

The nuclear-weapon States should express their commitment to undertake a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of progressive and deep reductions of nuclear weapons, and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons.

The States parties support the establishment of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament. It would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.

- Nuclear disarmament is further substantially facilitated by the continued easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference should thus be fulfilled with determination and without further delay. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament as well as their commitment to the principles and objectives adopted by the Conference.

The States parties emphasize the importance of making every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty, despite its shortcomings and to prepare the Treaty for implementation in a manner that prevents, to the maximum extent possible, further qualitative development of nuclear weapons.

The States parties emphasize the need to pursue negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

The States parties reaffirm their commitment to pursue negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to continue to identify, negotiate and implement further steps necessary to achieve this objective within the shortest possible framework of time.

- In the context of the "systematic and progressive efforts" which they have agreed to pursue, the nuclear-weapon States should set out their

perspective on the future steps they will take to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

- The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a major step in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, especially as a means of constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of preventing the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary for all States signatories, by contributing to the work of the CTBT Preparatory Committee, to make steady efforts to establish the CTBT regime, including verification systems. All signatories should strive to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty. Those States which have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty are urged to do so at the earliest possible date.

Now that the CTBT has been concluded, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is the next step in nuclear disarmament. It is regrettable that negotiations on FMCT have not yet commenced in the Conference on Disarmament. All means should be explored to realize the early commencement of negotiations on FMCT.

Systematic and progressive efforts pursued by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons globally are an important element in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI. The commitment made by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation at the Helsinki summit meeting to further reduce, in the context of the START process, their strategic nuclear arms by the year 2007, is most welcome.

Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by each nuclear-weapon State are further encouraged. In the light of General Assembly resolution 51/45 G of 10 December 1996, entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", every nuclear-weapon State is invited to inform the international community of the activities and progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. These efforts would contribute to transparency and confidence-building.

The efforts of the international community to promote and assist in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the management and disposal of fissile materials derived from dismantled nuclear weapons should be further encouraged.

The nuclear-weapon States are invited to consider further steps such as gradually taking nuclear forces off alert and/or removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.

- The States parties welcome the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, and call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date

[If the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force:]

, in particular those States upon whose adherence entry into force of the Treaty depends.

The States parties call on all States to sign and ratify a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention, negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament of 24 March 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein.

Welcoming the progress towards nuclear disarmament made by the nuclear-weapon States, including that made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, the States parties call for further progress towards global reductions of nuclear arsenals. The States parties urge the nuclear-weapon States to continue the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and all States to continue the determined pursuit of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control.

[If START II has not been ratified:]

The States parties call for the START II Treaty to be ratified as soon as possible and for an early start to negotiations on a START III treaty.

[If START III has not been concluded:]

The States parties call for an early conclusion to negotiations on a START III treaty.

The States parties welcome efforts by the group of seven major industrialized countries and the Russian Federation to address the issue of management of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

[If the Chemical Weapons Convention is not universal:]

The States parties urge all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

[If negotiation on a Biological Weapons Convention verification protocol is not completed:]

The States parties urge the Ad Hoc Group of the States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to complete as soon as possible a legally binding verification and compliance regime for the Treaty.

The States parties recommend that all regions make major reductions in their level of conventional arms, as has been done in Europe on the basis of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

- The States parties welcome the adoption and signature by more than 140 countries of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and underline their commitment to strictly observe its provisions pending entry into force. The States parties not yet party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to join this Treaty. The States parties further agree to pursue all possible measures consistent with international law to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.

The States parties continue to attach high priority to negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. The States parties agree to consider what further steps might be taken to enable these negotiations to begin promptly.

The nuclear-weapon States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, and undertake to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States parties declare unequivocally their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start immediately on the practical first steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

The nuclear-weapon States agree to pursue with determination the elimination of nuclear weapons through all available channels, including in bilateral negotiations and in negotiations among all five nuclear-weapon States.

The States parties agree that the Conference on Disarmament, the international community's standing body for disarmament negotiations, is mandated to pursue all items on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for multilateral dialogue and the negotiation of further steps, as appropriate, which contribute to the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

- There would be merit in voluntary measures to increase transparency on holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Transparency as a confidence-building measure should apply to all States with a nuclear capability, but for obvious reasons the primary burden would fall on the nuclear-weapon States.

A fundamental prerequisite for transparency would be the application of consistent and strict standards of accounting and secure handling and storage procedures for fissile material at the national level.

Voluntary transparency measures of this character would facilitate negotiations on a "cut-off" treaty as well as any future talks on nuclear disarmament.

The following measures could be considered for successive implementation:

- (a) All nuclear-capable States would submit information on their stocks, if any, of weapons-grade fissile material;
 - (b) Cooperative international measures would be put into place in order to clarify and confirm these declarations;
 - (c) The nuclear-weapon States, or any State that submits information on holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, could permit inspection of such holdings. The aim would be to ensure that the inventory in storage can only be withdrawn for non-weapons purposes;
 - (d) Agreed monitored net reductions from stockpiles could be envisaged.
- An exchange of views and negotiations should be begun on a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, taking into account the specific nature of their nuclear arsenals and possibly with a certain asymmetry of commitments.

The nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon States should be stationed only within their own territories.

- The adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be recorded as one of the goals of the States parties that has been accomplished. Paragraph 4 (a) of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should be replaced by a call on the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and for its signature and ratification by all the members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the Russian Federation and the United States of America, should be called upon to continue in the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally and to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective control. The other nuclear-weapon States should join in the process of structured and verified nuclear disarmament as soon as possible.

- (a) The States parties should welcome progress made in the negotiation of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear

weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein.

OR

(b) The States parties should renew the call contained in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament for the Conference on Disarmament to commence immediately negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein. All States parties that are members of the Conference should work actively to achieve that goal.

The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to deliberate and agree upon the practical steps and negotiations required for a programme of systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate totally nuclear weapons.

- The States parties take note of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 and in particular the unanimous conclusion by the Court that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

The States parties welcome the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States in their joint statement of 8 April 1997 to the Preparatory Committee at its first session that they would continue to pursue, with determination, systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. The States parties underline the importance that the specific steps to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their commitment be identified and fully implemented.

The States parties welcome the report of the Canberra Commission, which proposes a series of concrete measures towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, and commend the report for consideration in international disarmament forums with a view to exploring the possibilities of implementing the steps set out in the report.

- The States parties recognize that the nuclear arms race between the United States of America and the Russian Federation has ended and that this aspect of article VI has been fulfilled.

The States parties endorse the effectiveness of the step-by-step process of nuclear disarmament and recognize that nuclear disarmament can only take place in a stable international security environment.

The States parties support the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty as an important step for multilateral action

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and recognize both the disarmament and non-proliferation aspects of a fissile material cut-off convention.

Welcoming the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, States parties support the regional or nuclear-weapon-free-zone approach to the provision of legally binding security assurances, as opposed to a global convention.

- We stress the importance of early signature and ratification of the Treaty by all States, which would facilitate its early entry into force; this is an objective we fully share.

We also reaffirm our readiness for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a goal contained in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and as its second step, following the completion of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

We encourage all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fulfil this shared commitment set forth in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We also stress the importance for the States which are not yet parties to the Treaty to join the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

It is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States underscore the important and tangible progress achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament and reaffirm our determination to continue the pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

In this context we welcome the recent understanding reached by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America at Helsinki on further reductions of nuclear weapons building on progress already achieved.

The other steps being taken by us in this area are also to be welcomed.

We also welcome the removal of all nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

- All existing zones should come into force as soon as possible, and the process of ratification of their Protocols by relevant States completed.

The States of the regions concerned, and in particular those in regions of tension, should engage in discussions on possible arrangements for additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by 2000. This includes the Central Asian region, for which there is now a proposal on the table under the Almaty Declaration.

Work on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be intensified as a contribution to peace and stability in the region and internationally.

Cooperation and coordination between States parties and signatories of existing zones under the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should be actively pursued to promote the common goals of those Treaties.

- The States parties are encouraged by the historic events of the past few years that enhanced the atmosphere of trust, mutual respect and partnership among European States as well as the prerequisites for practical implementation of the idea to free the world of nuclear weapons, in particular the withdrawal of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and thus from the entire Central and Eastern European region, ranging from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

The States parties acknowledge the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their effective efforts in nuclear disarmament and consistent fulfilment of their obligations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles, and note with satisfaction the significant contribution of those States to the strengthening of the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security.

Thus, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe could reaffirm the intention of the European States to move towards the final goal of the achievement of general and complete nuclear disarmament under effective international control.

- The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States concerned, particularly in regions afflicted with conflicts, enhances regional and global peace and security and contributes to non-proliferation and disarmament.

- All States should support the efforts of the non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at and in the light of the actual conditions of the regions concerned. All nuclear-weapon States should pledge their support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect their status and undertake corresponding obligations.
- Taking into account article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference relating to the establishment of such zones, States parties should express support of measures taken by a State party or group of States parties to establish nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and support proposals to establish these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regimes and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States parties should welcome the initiative taken by States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

The States parties and signatories to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should promote the common goals envisaged in those Treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.

- The States parties reaffirm their conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security.

The States parties welcome the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995 and express their support for the establishment of a mechanism for cooperation among the agencies of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Bangkok, Rarotonga and Pelindaba. The States parties decide to follow all actions required for the early establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

All nuclear States express their commitment to respect and support the relevant protocols necessary for the maximum effectiveness of the established nuclear-weapon-free zones.

- In the light of recent encouraging developments, it is important to reaffirm that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security.
- Significant progress has been made since 1995 in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia and in the growth of support for nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions.

In realization of the recommendations contained in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are especially pleased to note that on 28 February 1997 they formally endorsed, in the Almaty Declaration, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. This joint action, following earlier initiatives by several countries of the region, is indicative of the importance the States of Central Asia attach to article VII of the Treaty and paragraphs V to VII of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

As the States parties to the Treaty prepare for the next Review Conference in the year 2000, the Preparatory Committee takes positive note of this development.

- Creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones within the boundaries of individual States complements the obligations undertaken by the States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, by prohibiting within such zones deployment of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, the dumping of radioactive wastes, etc., they expand the geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Mongolia's declaration of its territory as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992, which has been welcomed and supported by all nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, has demonstrated that the creation of such zones within the boundaries of single States (single-State zones) is, in general, politically acceptable. For nuclear-weapon-free zones to be effective, irrespective of their geographical scope, they should be based on international agreement(s), have clearly defined rights and obligations of parties to such agreement(s), a system of verification and control to guarantee compliance with the obligations derived from such status, the assurances from parties to the agreements, etc. Therefore, in order for single-State zones to have equal legal basis with other zones, the objectives, purposes and principles, as well as the status of the zones, should be clearly defined in international agreement(s), taking duly into account the experience of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the specifics of single-State zones. The interests of neighbouring States should also be duly taken into account.

Bearing in mind the important role that single-State zones could play as concrete disarmament and confidence-building measures in widening the geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and thus contributing to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mongolia believes that the Preparatory Committee should focus specifically on this question and contribute to developing practical procedures in institutionalizing such forms of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States concerned with their neighbours as well as the nuclear-weapon States.

- The States parties welcome the considerable progress in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones since the 1995 Conference, and especially the establishment of the zones created by the Treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok. The States parties furthermore renew their call for the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the regions concerned, especially in regions where they do not exist, such as the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia.
- Considering nuclear-weapon-free zones to be important complementary instruments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the States parties welcome advances made in this field, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned.
- The States parties reaffirm their conviction that nuclear-weapon-free zones are important disarmament measures which enhance regional and global peace and security, greatly strengthen the international non-proliferation regime in all its aspects and contribute to the objective of securing a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

The States parties welcome the conclusion of two further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties (the treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok) and the recent entry into force of the latter.

The States parties reaffirm the importance of the cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their support for the relevant protocols to the treaties. In this context they welcome the signature by all nuclear-weapon States of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga. They look forward to the signature and ratification of the relevant Protocols by those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so.

The States parties welcome the consultation which is currently under way between the nuclear-weapon States and the South-East Asian States in relation to the Protocols to the Treaty of Bangkok and urge those States to make every effort to resolve the remaining differences in order to facilitate adherence to the Protocols.

The States parties welcome the intention of States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba to promote the common goals envisaged in those Treaties, and to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation.

- China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America reaffirm our conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security.

We consider that the signature by all the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the South Pacific and in

Africa, was a significant development. By signing these protocols, all the nuclear-weapon States are giving security assurances in treaty form to the very large number of States concerned.

Moreover, we remain ready to work with the signatories of the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to remove those obstacles currently preventing the nuclear-weapon States from signing the Protocol to that Treaty.

Security assurances

- Further steps should be taken to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We welcome and will actively explore ideas in this respect, including those aimed at an internationally legally binding instrument.
- All nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude, at an early date, legally binding international instruments to that effect.
- The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. In this regard, there is no objection, in principle, in the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly, to the idea of an international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Hence, the States parties should agree to negotiate, in the Preparatory Committee meetings for the 2000 Review Conference on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally adopted by the 2000 Review Conference as a protocol annexed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
- The States parties agree to commence negotiations and conclude in the shortest possible time a treaty banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances pursuant to the successful conclusion of the legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- The importance of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime is fully recognized. Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the principles and objectives.

- These States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe that international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should cover both negative and positive security assurances.

They consider that, by renouncing voluntarily their nuclear option, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have a legitimate right to receive legally binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

In this context, these States parties consider that the unilateral declarations made by the four nuclear-weapon States, and Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 and 984 (1995) of 4 November 1995 on security assurances have not fulfilled the requirements of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Accordingly, the delegations of Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan consider that the time is now opportune to negotiate and conclude a protocol to the Treaty, providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

These States parties, therefore, propose a draft protocol to the Treaty on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The text of the protocol is annexed hereto.

These States parties are of the view that all States parties to the Treaty must take effective measures for nuclear disarmament, a ban on fissile materials, conclusion of an international legally binding instrument providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and universal adherence to the Treaty. With regard to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, these States parties urge the Preparatory Committee to address this issue in a substantive manner with a view to concluding a protocol to the Treaty, not later than the time of the convening of the 2000 Review Conference. The draft protocol, proposed by the States parties, will provide a basis for negotiations at the Conference or at the Preparatory Committee meetings.

These States parties firmly believe that conclusions of such a protocol on security assurances constitute an essential element of an effective regime of the Treaty, will strengthen the Treaty and will contribute to the success of the 2000 Review Conference.

- The States parties welcome the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 4 November 1995, as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances as important developments in this field. The States parties recommend that further steps be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could take the form of an international legally binding instrument. The States parties

recognize that treaty-based security assurances are available to parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones through the signature of the relevant protocols to such zones by the nuclear-weapon States. The States parties recommend that concerned States that have not yet signed and ratified these treaties do so as soon as possible and thus bring into effect those security assurances.

- The need for an international legally binding, comprehensive and unconditional arrangement to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has remained primordial and must be pursued. Nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty-based security assurances, some of which precede the Treaty, and which are regional, cannot take the place of a global one because, being party to a nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty does not relieve a State from fulfilling the obligations that it has undertaken by its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Indeed, the status makes it imperative for a State to comply with the Treaty, and thereby strengthen the Treaty - which is the main axis of the global non-proliferation regime. This should also be the relationship between a global legal instrument on security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty-based security assurances.

It is necessary therefore for the instrument to be negotiated multilaterally. It needs to have as its starting point the obligation of "no use, no first use" of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In other words, there must be a clear commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. For just as the non-nuclear-weapon States accepted treaty provisions not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, they should equally be assured in treaty form that they would not be victims of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The comprehensive assurances to be given must be such that States would be unable to withdraw from fulfilling them, especially during hostilities, because of what may be claimed to be national interest, and the assurances should not be vulnerable to the veto. It is also necessary for it to be noted somewhere in the instrument that the best assurances against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of those weapons, and that measures to that effect are highly desirable.

- The Preparatory Committee recommends that time be allocated at its second session for further debate and consideration of proposals that have been made on the issue of security assurances.

The States parties recommend that the 2000 Review Conference endorse an instrument on legally binding security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty for signature and ratification.

(iii) Main Committee II issues

Safeguards

- The conclusion of negotiations on the "93+2" model protocol and its expected adoption by the special meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in May is welcomed as a significant contribution to strengthening safeguards. Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should conclude and ratify agreements with IAEA and implement the 93+2 package of safeguards as soon as possible to help ensure that safeguards are effectively strengthened and in a cost-efficient manner. These strengthened safeguards should become the new norm for comprehensive safeguards to maximize the potential of the Treaty to provide solid non-proliferation assurances.

All States that do not have comprehensive safeguards agreements in place, and especially the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, should adopt the maximum number of measures identified in the model protocol that would help contribute to the effectiveness and the efficiency of safeguards. The undertakings by a number of such States to work towards that goal is welcomed.

All non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should now ensure that their commitment to the full-scope safeguards standard for new supply through practical trading arrangements is fully observed.

States not parties to the Treaty that continue to have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities should enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA without delay.

Nuclear-weapon States should place permanently under IAEA safeguards all of the nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities.

The safeguards agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with IAEA, which remains binding and in force, should be implemented without delay. The full implementation of the Agreed Framework between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America will be an important contribution to international peace and security.

- We urge every State party to the Treaty that has not already done so to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pursuant to article III of the Treaty. We also urge States not party to the Treaty to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements.

We look forward to approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the model protocol to safeguards agreements (part II 93+2).

We call upon the nuclear-weapon States to place permanently under safeguards nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities.

- In order to facilitate the Treaty's function in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, the States parties should continue to support the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

All States parties should support the IAEA programme for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. The nuclear-weapon States should apply those measures provided for in the model protocol that each of them identifies as capable of contributing to the nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

- International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are an essential element in providing a guarantee that States are complying with article III undertakings. All States parties that have not yet done so should sign without delay the safeguard agreements required by article III of the Treaty.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe that new supply arrangements for the transfer of the source of special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope safeguards.

Nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

- The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent responsible body to verify compliance of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by other States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of these rights based on allegations of non-compliance which are not verified by IAEA.

All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without further delay.

A further position on 93+2 to be developed at the second session of the Preparatory Committee.

A report should be furnished by the Secretariat on the fulfilment of requirements related to the transfer of nuclear material to non-nuclear States for evaluation of the issue by the States parties (principles and objectives, para. 13).

Information needs to be provided by the Secretariat on actual placing under Agency safeguards of material transferred from military to peaceful uses for evaluation by the States parties.

- It is noteworthy that a model protocol on measures of the second part of the 93+2 programme was adopted in the Drafting Committee to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards. It is strongly hoped that this model protocol will be adopted by the IAEA Special Board of Governors in May.
- The States parties call on all States and other Parties with INFCIRC 153-type agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency that have not yet done so to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into effect additional safeguards agreements using the model protocol containing the second part of the 93+2 programme measures as a standard text.

The States parties call on States with voluntary offer safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency that have not yet done so to conclude additional agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency incorporating measures that they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the protocol, when implemented with regard to that party and as consistent with its obligations under article I.

The States parties call upon States with INFCIRC 66-type safeguards agreements to negotiate and bring into effect agreements providing for the implementation of the second part of the 93+2 programme measures.

The States parties recommend that each party with nuclear materials on its territory maintain and improve its own arrangements for nuclear materials accountancy, safety and physical protection, applying the appropriate internationally agreed standards.

- We recommend that, as soon as the Board of Governors of IAEA has approved the text, all States parties should be encouraged to begin negotiating their individual agreements with IAEA as soon as practicable; this will enable early implementation of the strengthened safeguards on a global basis.

At the same time, we would sincerely welcome an indication on the part of the States that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with limited safeguards agreements, some of which are observing the Preparatory Committee (and, of course, we welcome their interest very much) that they too were considering the possible application of the model protocol to their own situations.

An important element of the strengthened safeguards is that they should not place an undue burden on members; it is therefore encouraging that the IAEA secretariat has assured members that in the medium to long term the process will be cost-neutral.

- The States parties urge all States that have not done so to conclude and bring into force the safeguards agreements required by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The States parties further urge those with comprehensive safeguards agreements to implement those safeguards-strengthening measures already approved by the Board of Governors of IAEA, and conclude and bring into force a protocol to their safeguards agreements incorporating 93+2 safeguards-strengthening measures at an early time.

The States parties reiterate that IAEA should take full advantage of its rights under special inspections.

Taking note of the United States of America/Russian Federation/IAEA trilateral fissile material initiative, the States parties welcome unilateral decisions to accept safeguards on nuclear material no longer needed for defence purposes, and endorse plans for the safe and effective disposition of plutonium and high-enriched uranium no longer needed for defence requirements in a manner that renders it unavailable for use in nuclear explosives.

The States parties call upon parties to provide political, technical and financial support so that IAEA can meet all of its obligations.

The States parties urge all States to adopt physical protection arrangements that reflect the latest international standard and adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and request all States to take safeguards and physical protection requirements into account when planning and designing new facilities.

- Nuclear supplier regimes should not restrict access for developing countries to advanced technology. This would be contrary to the range of undertakings on peaceful nuclear cooperation reaffirmed most recently at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The fulfilment of nuclear supplier obligations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is facilitated by an effective non-proliferation regime, of which strict and transparent nuclear supply policies are an integral part.

The international Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation, to be held in Vienna on 6 and 7 October 1997 following the forty-first session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency is welcomed as a first step to improve further transparency in the operation of nuclear export control regimes. All States are encouraged to attend and participate actively in this seminar.

Adherence by all States to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines would be consistent with the Treaty and nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty objectives of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Non-member States should receive assistance and advice about the practical and legal aspects of implementing the Guidelines from members of nuclear supplier regimes.

- We regard effective national nuclear export controls as integral to a strong non-proliferation regime which facilitates international nuclear cooperation in pursuit of economic and technological development.

We support ongoing efforts to enhance transparency in multilaterally agreed nuclear export guidelines and call upon all States to join in this activity.

- The States parties recommend that transparency in nuclear-related export controls should continue to be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

All States parties should exercise their responsibility to control nuclear-related exports whatever their destination and give full effect to their commitment that new supply arrangements should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency's full-scope safeguards and international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The States parties call upon parties that have not yet done so to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.

- Efforts should be strengthened to increase the effectiveness and transparency of export control systems through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee.
- The States parties call upon all parties that have not yet done so to adhere to the Programme of Action on Illicit Trafficking as agreed by the group of seven major industrialized countries and the Russian Federation. The States parties that have adhered should continue to work to promote international cooperation between the relevant national agencies with a view to preventing such smuggling.

(iv) Main Committee III issues

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

The States parties reaffirm the importance they attach to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable rights of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

The States parties also reaffirm the importance they attach to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency as the principal agent for multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and reiterate their call for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

The States parties welcome the progress made since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in developing and strengthening the international legal and institutional framework within which the development of research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes takes place.

In this context, the States parties welcome the entry into force in 1996 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and call on countries that have not already done so - particularly those with nuclear installations that fall within the scope of the Convention - to sign and ratify the Convention. States parties also welcome the conclusion of the negotiations on the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. States parties note the progress that has been made towards the development of a comprehensive international nuclear liability regime and express the hope for an early conclusion to these negotiations.

The States parties stress the importance they attach to efforts at the national, regional and global levels to promote and maintain the highest standards of nuclear safety, waste management and radiation protection. They welcome the initiatives that have been taken to this end since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, held in Moscow on 19 and 20 April 1996, and the Tokyo Conference on Nuclear Safety in Asia, held at Tokyo in 1996.

The States parties note that it is in the interests of all States that the transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level waste be conducted in accordance with strict international standards of safety and security. They note that the transportation of such materials by sea is a matter of particular concern to small island developing States and other coastal States. A number of States in this category call on those directly engaged in the maritime transportation of radioactive materials to continue to provide information, consistent with safety and security requirements, about the timing, route and liability arrangements to States in the vicinity of such shipments.

Canada believes in the right, as set out in article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of all parties to the Treaty to engage in and to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear

energy - a right to be exercised in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

Through bilateral agreements, Canada is engaged in the full range of cooperation as called for in paragraph 15 of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In accordance with paragraph 18 of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Canada is working actively to bring into force in Canada the provisions of three recently agreed international agreements: the International Atomic Energy Agency Convention on Nuclear Safety, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships (the INF Code), and revised IAEA recommendations on transportation of nuclear fuel.

Canada would welcome the approval of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

As a significant donor to the Technical Cooperation Fund, Canada believes that there can be no further growth in the Fund unless the donor base is broadened. It strongly urges all States in a position to contribute their fair share to do so.

All States parties should make every effort to facilitate international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States that are in a position to do so should assist the developing countries to master technologies for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

All States parties should ensure that measures taken by them to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation would facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of the legitimate rights of the developing countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those restrictions on the transfer of technologies for peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are beyond safeguards required under the Treaty should be removed.

The inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination must be reaffirmed by all nuclear and non-nuclear States parties alike. It is also essential that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties be fully guaranteed. States parties should reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of article IV of the Treaty.

Unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.

In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking into account particularly the needs of developing countries.

The States parties recognize the shortcomings in the realization of the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty and those of the principles and objectives decision related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and decide to take further steps to ensure full, unrestricted and indiscriminate implementation of all these provisions.

Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking into account particularly the needs of developing countries.

Arrangements to control nuclear-related exports for the purpose of non-proliferation should be transparent and balanced in membership to include both supplier and recipient States parties. Their activities and guidelines should under no circumstances and in no way hamper or limit any State party's exercise of the rights and privileges set out in the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty and those of the principles and objectives decision as well as the fulfilment of all related commitments contained therein. Initial efforts towards transparency of existing nuclear-related export controls should be followed by immediate action to ensure full transparency and participation on an equal footing by all interested parties.

All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and should observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.

Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet its responsibilities effectively in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.

Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. All States parties remain committed to pursue such actions, particularly in relation to facilities that are under IAEA safeguard.

- The entry into force, in October 1996, of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is a welcome development. The Group of Experts is to be commended for its tireless efforts to finalize the draft text of a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Group's recommendation that a diplomatic conference be convened with a view to adopting the Convention is also worthy of support.

It is important that the transport of nuclear materials should be conducted in a safe and secure manner and in compliance with the safety standards of IAEA and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), while navigational rights and freedoms as provided for in the applicable rules of international law should not be impaired.

- As noted in the report of Main Committee III of the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was adopted by consensus, there have been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences have resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. The Preparatory Committee reiterates the 1995 Conference's call upon all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes in those affected areas.
- The States parties recommend continued international cooperation in this field, taking into account, in particular, the needs of developing countries.

The States parties call on all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety at the earliest possible date.

The States parties urge early conclusion of a convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management, and call on all States to sign and ratify that convention at the earliest possible date.

- The disarmament process requires strict procedures for safe handling, storage and disposal of sensitive nuclear materials as well as safe management of radioactive contaminants in compliance with high standards of environmental protection and nuclear safety.

Continued international attention needs to be directed at the problems of safety and contamination related to former nuclear operations, inter alia, associated with discontinued nuclear weapons programmes.

We would reiterate the call made in an agreed draft document of Main Committee III of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference addressed to all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving assistance as may be requested in affected areas, taking into account efforts that have been made or that are planned to be implemented at the regional and national levels in this regard.

- Recognizing the right and obligation of States not to transfer nuclear-related items and technology if they believe such transfer will contribute to proliferation, the States parties call for continued efforts to improve nuclear-related export controls so that such controls can continue to promote the objectives of the Treaty by reducing the risks of proliferation and by contributing to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The States parties urge all States to ensure that nuclear material is subject to a system of accountancy and control at the State and facility level that meets the latest international standards.

The States parties reaffirm the view, expressed in the principles and objectives decision, that new supply arrangements of nuclear material and equipment controlled pursuant to article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards.

- China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America attach importance to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty. In this context we reaffirm our commitment towards cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty and following the decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
- The States parties note that radioactive material has been successfully transported by sea for more than 30 years in accordance with internationally agreed standards of safety and security.

The States parties also note that it is in the interests of all States that the transport of radioactive material should continue to be conducted in a safe and secure manner in accordance with relevant INF and IAEA codes. We urge early conclusion of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which provides the basis for a possible future framework for transboundary movement of such material.

The States parties conclude that, while navigational rights and freedoms as provided for by the applicable rules of international law should not be impaired, the States concerned should maintain a dialogue on the transport by sea of the material in question.

Appendix

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY DELEGATIONS
DURING THE FIRST SESSION

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/2
8 April 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

First session
New York, 7 to 18 April 1997

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATIONS OF FRANCE, CHINA, THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT AT THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
FOR THE REVIEW CONFERENCE

The delegations of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, in the particular context of the commencement of the strengthened review process agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reiterate our countries' strong and continuing support for the Treaty. We express our determination to continue to implement fully all the provisions of the Treaty, including those of article VI.

Stressing the importance of the indefinite extension of the Treaty, we reaffirm our continued support for the documents adopted by consensus on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty.¹

We welcome the fact that Andorra, Angola, Chile, Comoros, Djibouti, the United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu and Oman have acceded to the Treaty since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. We stress the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty which would contribute to the enhancement of both regional and global security.

* * *

Since the May 1995 Review and Extension Conference, there have been very significant developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, notably with respect to the programme of action set out in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament:²

(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 is a step that has long been one of the highest priority objectives of the international community.

The signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by more than 140 States, including the 5 nuclear-weapon States that signed on the first day of its opening for signature on 24 September 1996, is a historic event.

/...

By banning any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, the Treaty, as stated in its preamble, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.

This is why China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States value this Treaty. We are pleased to see that, in such a short period of time since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, this major achievement, followed by the successful creation of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty took place.

We stress the importance of early signature and ratification of the Treaty by all States which would facilitate its early entry into force; this is an objective we fully share.

(b) We also reaffirm our readiness for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a goal contained in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and as its second step, following the completion of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

Such a treaty will cap the fissile material stockpiles available for use in nuclear weapons and, by adding new constraints, will strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and will constitute a significant step towards the eventual achievement of nuclear disarmament.

We encourage all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fulfil this shared commitment set forth in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We also stress the importance for the States which are not yet parties to the Treaty to join the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

(c) It is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States underscore the important and tangible progress achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament and reaffirm our determination to continue the pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

In this context we welcome the recent understanding reached by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States at Helsinki on further reductions of nuclear weapons building on progress already achieved.

The other steps being taken by us in this area are also to be welcomed.

We also welcome the removal of all nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the territories of Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine.

(d) China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States reaffirm our conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security.

We consider that the signature by all the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in the South Pacific and in Africa, was a significant development. By signing these protocols, all the nuclear-weapon States are giving security assurances in treaty form to the very large number of States concerned.

Moreover, we remain ready to work with the signatories of the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to remove those obstacles currently preventing the nuclear-weapon States from signing the Protocol to that Treaty.

These steps are in line with the security assurances we have provided in our national declarations, which are referred to in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 and constitute a positive development with regard to the relevant paragraph of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

* * *

We are ready to contribute to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives by doing our part in support of the programme for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. In this regard, we intend to apply those measures provided for in the model protocol that each of us identifies as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Protocol, when implemented with regard to that State, and as consistent with that State's obligations under article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States attach importance to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty. In this context we reaffirm our commitment towards cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty and following the decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Notes

¹ 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)).

² Ibid., decision 2.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/3
10 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER ONE: ARTICLE VI

Submitted by New Zealand

Proposed elements for inclusion in the report of the
Preparatory Committee on its first session

Note. New Zealand will, over the course of the preparatory process, be looking to achieve consensus formulations that cover the ideas in the following proposals, some of which have already been advanced by other States parties. Those with an asterisk may be suitable for development during the course of the first session of the Preparatory Committee as positions on which all States parties can now agree.

Article VI. Principles and objectives

Paragraph 4 (a). Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

* States parties welcome the adoption and signature by more than 140 countries of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and underline their commitment to strictly observe its provisions pending entry into force. States parties not yet party to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty undertake to join this Treaty. States parties further agree to pursue all possible measures consistent with international law to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.

Paragraph 4 (b). Cut-off

* States parties continue to attach high priority to negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. States parties agree to consider what further steps might be taken to enable these negotiations to begin promptly.

Paragraph 4 (c). Nuclear disarmament

The nuclear-weapon States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, and undertake to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament

in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States parties declare unequivocally their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start immediately on the practical first steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

Nuclear-weapon States agree to pursue with determination the elimination of nuclear weapons through all available channels, including in bilateral negotiations and in negotiations among all five nuclear-weapon States.

* States parties agree that the Conference on Disarmament, the international community's standing body for disarmament negotiations, is mandated to pursue all items on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for multilateral dialogue and the negotiation of further steps, as appropriate, which contribute to the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/4
10 April 1997

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CLUSTER ONE

Submitted by Canada

UNIVERSALITY

We welcome the recent accessions to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which strengthen it and reaffirm the urgency of universal adherence.

We invite all States not yet party to the Treaty to review and revisit their positions, especially in view of the now near universal adherence to the Treaty.

START II, III AND BEYOND

We welcome the joint statement by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki on 21 March 1997 committing to the commencement of negotiations on a START III agreement, immediately once START II enters into force, which would establish, by 31 December 2007, lower aggregate levels of 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads, possible reductions in tactical nuclear systems and other measures to promote the irreversibility of these deep reductions.

State parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expect these commitments to be realized as soon as possible.

We call upon other nuclear-weapon States to commit immediately to not increasing their inventories and to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations among the five, in parallel with START III.

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY

We call on all States to make the utmost efforts to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, through all means possible up to and including the Conference of the States Parties to be held in 1999.

We emphasize that article 5 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referring to peaceful nuclear explosions, has been redefined and overtaken under the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

We recognize the decisive role that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty plays in preventing the development of new nuclear weapons and the modernization of existing ones. We look to the nuclear-weapon States to signal their unequivocal support for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force, by declaring their intention never again to conduct nuclear explosions.

FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF CONVENTION

We look to the earliest possible commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament towards a fissile material cut-off convention, on the basis of the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

Pending conclusion of such a convention, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to affirm or reaffirm, as the case may be, their commitment to forever cease production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Determined efforts should be made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles and to place more of such material under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

SECURITY ASSURANCES

Further steps should be taken to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We welcome and will actively explore ideas in this respect, including those aimed at an internationally legally binding instrument.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/5
10 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

**RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST ADOPTED BY THE 1995 REVIEW
AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

Submitted by Egypt*

1. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted a package consisting of three decisions and a resolution on the Middle East.¹
2. The adoption of a resolution on the Middle East and the fact that it was the only resolution by the Conference concerning a specific region is a clear expression by the States parties of their concern over the seriousness of the situation in the Middle East resulting from the existence of ambiguous nuclear policies and unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in the region endangering regional and international peace and security.
3. As the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons starts its first session, and in order to achieve the universality of the Treaty, there is an urgent need to assess the situation in the Middle East in the light of the aforementioned with a view to adopting recommendations by the Preparatory Committee pertaining to ways and means to ensure the full implementation of the provisions of the resolution.
4. Since May 1995, some specific positive developments have taken place and should be taken into consideration, these are:
 - (a) All States of the Middle East have become parties to the Treaty except Israel, the only State in the region that is not a party to the Treaty and that has not declared its intention to do so;
 - (b) The continued adoption by consensus, for the seventeenth year in a row, of a resolution by the General Assembly calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

* On behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(c) The widespread support for resolution 51/48 of 10 December 1996 adopted by the General Assembly at its fifty-first session on agenda item 74, entitled "The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East" calling upon Israel, the only State in the Middle East that is not yet party to the Treaty and has not declared its intention to do so, to accede to the Treaty without further delay, and not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. This support reflects the increased concern of the international community resulting from the fact that Israel is defying the repeated calls to join the Treaty;

(d) The readiness demonstrated by Arab States to take practical steps towards the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective in accordance with paragraph 5 of the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.¹ On the other hand, Israel continues to prevent and avoid any discussion on this issue in all relevant forums, particularly at the regional level.

5. Any assessment based on these considerations will lead only to one conclusion, namely that all Arab States are complying with the provisions of the Treaty as well as with the letter and spirit of the resolution, while Israel continues to defy those repeated calls by refusing to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

6. It is therefore imperative that the Preparatory Committee address this important issue with a view to correcting the existing imbalance between the compliance by all Arab States with their obligations in accordance with the Treaty and the resolution on the Middle East on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the risk imposed by Israel's ambiguous nuclear policies and its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to the whole region of the Middle East.

7. All States parties to the Treaty, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, have a responsibility to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts to achieve the full implementation of the resolution. The role of the depository States in shouldering their primary responsibilities as co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East is crucial in implementing the resolution.

Notes

¹ 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/6
10 April 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

LETTER RECEIVED ON 10 APRIL 1997 FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE
PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
TRANSMITTING THE JOINT STATEMENTS FROM THE MARCH 1997 SUMMIT
MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, HELD AT HELSINKI

We would like to share with you the attached joint statements from the
March 1997 summit meeting between the Presidents of the United States of America
and the Russian Federation held at Helsinki. These statements, which address
parameters on future reduction in nuclear forces, the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty and European security, are relevant to the work of the Preparatory
Committee now under way. We request that you circulate the text of the present
letter and its annexes as an official document of the Committee.

(Signed) Lawrence SCHEINMAN
For the United States of America

(Signed) Serguei I. KISLYAK
For the Russian Federation

ANNEX I

March 21, 1997

JOINT STATEMENT
JOINT U.S.-RUSSIAN STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the present security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region. They reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of building a stable, secure, integrated and undivided democratic Europe. The roles of the United States and Russia as powers with worldwide responsibilities place upon them a special requirement to cooperate closely to this end. They confirmed that this cooperation will be guided by the spirit of openness and pragmatism which has increasingly come to characterize the U.S.-Russian relationship in recent years.

Recalling their May 1995 Joint Statement on European Security, the Presidents noted that lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all of the continent into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation. No institution by itself can ensure security. The Presidents agreed that the evolution of security structures should be managed in a way that threatens no state and that advances the goal of building a more stable and integrated Europe. This evolution should be based on a broad commitment to the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Code of Conduct and other OSCE documents, including respect for human rights, democracy and political pluralism, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.

The Presidents are convinced that strengthening the OSCE, whose potential has yet to be fully realized, meets the interests of the United States and Russia. The Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the Lisbon Summit of the OSCE and agreed on the importance of implementing its decisions, both to define further the goals of security cooperation and to continue to devise innovative methods for carrying out the growing number of tasks the OSCE has assumed.

They underscored their commitment to enhance the operational capability of the OSCE as the only framework for European security cooperation providing for full and equal participation of all states. The rule of consensus should remain an inviolable basis for OSCE decision-making. The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to work together in the ongoing OSCE effort to develop a model for security in Europe which takes account of the radically changed situation on the eve of the 21st century and the decisions of the Lisbon Summit concerning a charter on European security. The OSCE's essential role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its ability to develop new forms of peacekeeping and conflict prevention should also be actively pursued.

In their talks in Helsinki, the two Presidents paid special attention to the question of relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation. They continued to disagree on the issue of NATO enlargement. In order to minimize the potential consequences of this disagreement, the Presidents agreed that they should work, both together and with others, on a document that will establish cooperation between NATO and Russia as an important element of a new comprehensive European security system. Signed by the leaders of the NATO countries and Russia, this document would be an enduring commitment at the highest political level. They further agreed that the NATO-Russia relationship, as defined in this document, should provide for consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible where appropriate, joint decision-making and action on security issues of common concern.

The Presidents noted that the NATO-Russia document would reflect and contribute both to the profound transformation of NATO, including its political and peacekeeping dimension, and to the new realities of Russia as it builds a democratic society. It will also reflect the shared commitment of both NATO and Russia to develop their relations in a manner that enhances mutual security.

The Presidents recalled the historic significance of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in establishing the trust necessary to build a common security space on the continent in the interest of all states in Europe, whether or not they belong to a military or political alliance, and to continue to preclude any destabilizing build-up of forces in different regions of Europe.

The Presidents stressed the importance of adapting the CFE Treaty. They agreed on the need to accelerate negotiations among CFE parties with a view to concluding by late spring or early summer of 1997 a framework agreement setting forth the basic elements of an adapted CFE Treaty, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Document on Scope and Parameters agreed at Lisbon in December 1996.

President Yeltsin underscored Russian concerns that NATO enlargement will lead to a potentially threatening build-up of permanently stationed combat forces of NATO near to Russia. President Clinton stressed that the Alliance contemplates nothing of the kind.

President Yeltsin welcomed President Clinton's statements and affirmed that Russia would exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

President Clinton also noted NATO's policy on nuclear weapons deployments, as articulated by the North Atlantic Council on December 10, 1996, that NATO members have "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states that are not now members of the Alliance, nor do they foresee any future need to do so. President Clinton noted NATO's willingness to include specific reference to this policy in the NATO-Russia document. President Yeltsin spoke in favor of including such a reference in the document.

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The Presidents agreed that the United States, Russia and all their partners in Europe face many common security challenges that can best be addressed through cooperation among all the states of the Euro-Atlantic area. They pledged to intensify their efforts to build on the common ground identified in their meetings in Helsinki to improve the effectiveness of European security institutions, including by concluding the agreements and arrangements outlined in this statement.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

/S/

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

/S/

Helsinki

March 21, 1997

ANNEX II

March 21, 1997

JOINT STATEMENT
CONCERNING THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty for these objectives as well as the necessity for effective theater missile defense (TMD) systems, consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.

The Presidents reaffirm the principles of their May 10, 1995 Joint Statement, which will serve as a basis for reaching agreement on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, including:

- The United States and Russia are each committed to the ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of strategic stability.
- Both sides must have the option to establish and to deploy effective theater missile defense systems. Such activity must not lead to violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty.
- Theater missile defense systems may be deployed by each side which (1) will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and (2) will not be tested to give such systems that capability.
- Theater missile defense systems will not be deployed by the sides for use against each other.
- The scale of deployment -- in number and geographic scope -- of theater missile defense systems by either side will be consistent with theater ballistic missile programs confronting that side.

In this connection, the United States and Russia have recently devoted special attention to developing measures aimed at assuring confidence of the Parties that their ballistic missile defense activities will not lead to circumvention of the ABM Treaty, to which the Parties have repeatedly reaffirmed their adherence.

The efforts undertaken by the Parties in this regard are reflected in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the United States and Russia issued on September 28, 1994, as well as in that of May 10, 1995. Important decisions were made at the United States-Russia summit meeting on April 23, 1996.

In order to fulfill one of the primary obligations under the ABM Treaty -- the obligation not to give non-ABM systems capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles and not to test them in an ABM mode -- the Presidents have instructed their respective delegations to complete the preparation of an agreement to ensure fulfillment of this requirement.

In Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) negotiations on the problem of demarcation between TMD systems and ABM systems, the United States and Russia, together with Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine, successfully finished negotiations on demarcation with respect to lower-velocity TMD systems. The Presidents note that agreements were also reached in 1996 with respect to confidence-building measures and ABM Treaty succession. The Presidents have instructed their experts to complete an agreement as soon as possible for prompt signature on higher-velocity TMD systems.

Neither side has plans before April 1999 to flight test, against a ballistic target missile, TMD interceptor missiles subject to the agreement on demarcation with respect to higher velocity TMD systems. Neither side has plans for TMD systems with interceptor missiles faster than 5.5 km/sec for land-based and air-based systems or 4.5 km/sec for sea-based systems. Neither side has plans to test TMD systems against target missiles with MIRVs or against reentry vehicles deployed or planned to be deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.

The elements for the agreement on higher-velocity TMD systems are:

The velocity of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 5 km/sec.

The flight range of the ballistic target missiles will not exceed 3500 km.

The sides will not develop, test, or deploy space-based TMD interceptor missiles or components based on other physical principles that are capable of substituting for such interceptor missiles.

The sides will exchange detailed information annually on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents noted that TMD technology is in its early stages and continues to evolve. They agreed that developing effective TMD while maintaining a viable ABM Treaty will require continued consultations. To this end, they reaffirm that their representatives to the Standing Consultative Commission will discuss, as foreseen under the ABM Treaty, any questions or concerns either side may have regarding TMD activities, including matters related to the agreement to be completed on higher-velocity systems, which will be based on this joint statement by the two Presidents, with a view to precluding violation or circumvention of the ABM Treaty. These consultations will be facilitated by the agreed detailed annual information exchange on TMD plans and programs.

The Presidents also agreed that there is considerable scope for cooperation in theater missile defense. They are prepared to explore integrated cooperative defense efforts, inter alia, in the provision of early warning support for TMD activities, technology cooperation in areas related to TMD, and expansion of the ongoing program of cooperation in TMD exercises.

In resolving the tasks facing them, the Parties will act in a spirit of cooperation, mutual openness, and commitment to the ABM Treaty.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

/S/

Helsinki

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

/S/

March 21, 1997

ANNEX III

March 21, 1997

JOINT STATEMENT ON PARAMETERS ON FUTURE REDUCTIONS
IN NUCLEAR FORCES

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to detarget strategic missiles. The START I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine are nuclear-weapon free. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings.

Once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:

Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.

Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.

Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.

Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.

The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence-building and transparency measures.

Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

/S/

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:

/S/

Helsinki

March 21, 1997

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/7
11 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER TWO

Submitted by Canada

Safeguards

1. We urge every State party to the Treaty which has not already done so to bring into force a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pursuant to article III of the Treaty. We also urge States not party to the Treaty to enter into comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.
2. We look forward to approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the model Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (Part II 93+2).
3. We call upon the nuclear-weapon States to place permanently under safeguards nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities.

Export controls/transparency

4. We regard effective national nuclear export controls as integral to a strong non-proliferation regime which facilitates international nuclear cooperation in pursuit of economic and technological development.
5. We support ongoing efforts to enhance transparency in multilaterally agreed nuclear export guidelines and call upon all States to join in this activity.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

6. The establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States concerned, particularly in regions afflicted with conflicts, enhances regional and global peace and security and contributes to non-proliferation and disarmament.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/8
11 April 1997

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First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER TWO: ARTICLE VII

Submitted by New Zealand

Proposed elements for inclusion in report of the Preparatory Committee on the work of its first session

- (i) States parties reaffirm their conviction that nuclear-weapon-free zones are important disarmament measures which enhance regional and global peace and security, greatly strengthen the international non-proliferation regime in all its aspects and contribute to the objective of securing a world entirely free of nuclear weapons;
- (ii) States parties welcome the conclusion of two further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties (the treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok) and the recent entry into force of the latter;
- (iii) States parties reaffirm the importance of the cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their support for the relevant protocols to the treaties. In this context they welcome the signature by all nuclear-weapon States of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga. They look forward to the signature and ratification of the relevant Protocols by those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so;
- (iv) The States parties welcome the consultation which is currently under way between the nuclear-weapon States and the South-East Asian States in relation to the Protocols to the Treaty of Bangkok and urge those States to make every effort to resolve the remaining differences in order to facilitate adherence to the Protocols;
- (v) The States parties welcome the intention of States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, and to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/9
11 April 1997

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New York, 7-18 April 1997

JAPAN

Some possible elements to be taken into account
in the review process

I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

1. It is important for the States parties to reconfirm the crucial role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The States parties should reconfirm that the stability of the Treaty regime is essential to the maintenance of world peace and security.
2. The new NPT review process is qualitatively different from past efforts. The decisions taken at the NPT Extension and Review Conference in 1995 require that the review process contribute to the promotion of full implementation of the Treaty and its universality, and particularly to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
3. Substantive aspects of the preparatory work must be fully considered in addition to making procedural preparations for the Review Conference.
4. The task of the Preparatory Committee is to review the operation and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. But it is also important to take fully into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, especially the decision on "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament".
5. It would not be useful to aim at achieving a consensus document at each Preparatory Committee meeting. Rather, the most appropriate and productive procedure would be for the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee meeting to issue a summary report, under his or her sole responsibility, with necessary annexes.
6. The final report, to be submitted to the Conference by the Preparatory Committee, should be prepared at the last Preparatory Committee meeting. It should include two parts, one reviewing the Treaty, and the other recommending measures for the future.
7. A revision of the document on "Principles and objectives" would not be desirable, since it was the product of arduous negotiations pursued at the 1995

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Review and Extension Conference and it stands on its own. Rather, it is important to strive to agree on a new set of objectives.

8. As the matter of overlap in the discussions of issues by the three Committees established during the past Review Conference is noted in paragraph 5 of the decision on "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty", appropriate attention should be paid to this matter by the Preparatory Committee.

II. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

9. The ultimate goal in nuclear disarmament is the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. Towards this end, it is important to accumulate steadily, one by one, realistic and effective disarmament measures, taking into account the realities of the international security environment.

10. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is a major step in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, especially as a means of constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of preventing the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary for all States signatories, by contributing to the work of the CTBT Preparatory Committee, to make steady efforts to establish the CTBT regime, including verification systems. All signatories should strive to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty. Those States which have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty are urged to do so at the earliest possible date.

11. Now that the CTBT has been concluded, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is the next step in nuclear disarmament. It is regrettable that negotiations on FMCT have not yet commenced in the Conference on Disarmament. All means should be explored to realize the early commencement of negotiations on FMCT.

12. Systematic and progressive efforts pursued by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons globally are an important element in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI. The commitment made by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation at the Helsinki summit meeting to further reduce, in the context of the START process, their strategic nuclear arms by the year 2007, is most welcome.

13. Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by each nuclear-weapon State are further encouraged. In light of General Assembly resolution 51/45 G of 10 December 1996, entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", every nuclear-weapon State is invited to inform the international community of the activities and progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. These efforts would contribute to transparency and confidence-building.

14. The efforts of the international community to promote and assist in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the management and disposal of fissile materials derived from dismantled nuclear weapons should be further encouraged.

15. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to consider further steps such as gradually taking nuclear forces off alert and/or removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.

16. The importance of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States of the NPT regime is fully recognized. Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the "Principles and objectives".

17. In the light of recent encouraging developments, it is important to reaffirm that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security.

18. Great progress has been made towards the ultimate goal of the universality of the NPT. The States parties should unite their efforts to encourage States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it as soon as possible. It would be useful to promote dialogue and confidence-building among the countries concerned so as to improve their regional security environment.

III. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

19. It is noteworthy that a model protocol on measures of the second part of the "Programme 93+2" was adopted in the Drafting Committee to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards. It is strongly hoped that this model protocol will be adopted by the IAEA Special Board of Governors in May.

20. Efforts should be strengthened to increase the effectiveness and transparency of export control systems through the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Zangger Committee.

21. The entry into force, in October 1996, of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is a welcome development. The Group of Experts is to be commended for its tireless efforts to finalize the draft text of a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Group's recommendation that a diplomatic conference be convened with a view to adopting the Convention is also worthy of support.

22. It is important that the transport of nuclear materials should be conducted in a safe and secure manner and in compliance with the safety standards of IAEA and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), while navigational rights and freedoms as provided for in the applicable rules of international law should not be impaired.

IV. SOME PROCEDURAL ISSUES

23. New York should be the venue of all Preparatory Committee meetings as well as the Review Conference itself, in order to facilitate the participation of a large number of States. It should also be noted that the cost of conference services is much lower in New York than in other cities.

24. It is necessary and important to keep the costs of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference reasonably low. Thus it is recommended that the length of each background document be limited to a specific number of pages. The necessity of issuing summary records of the meetings of the Preparatory Committee should be carefully considered, and if records are issued, the number should be limited to the minimum.

25. The formula for apportioning the costs of the review process should follow established precedent. This means that the nuclear-weapon States, which have a special status under the Treaty, would be responsible for 55 per cent of the costs.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/10
11 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

LETTER DATED 10 APRIL 1997 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON DISARMAMENT OF THE MOVEMENT OF
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

On behalf of the Group of States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and other States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Disarmament of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, I have the honour to enclose herewith the document entitled "Views of the States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and other States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the 2000 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings" (see annex). It contains various aspects related to the Treaty that are of paramount importance to the present and subsequent Preparatory Committee meetings as well as the 2000 Review Conference.

It would be highly appreciated if you could circulate the present letter and its annex as an official document of the Preparatory Committee.

(Signed) Nugroho WISNUMURTI

/...

ANNEX

Views of the States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and other States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the 2000 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings

I. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

General views

1. The forthcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be the harbinger of a new era in our continuing endeavours to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized and thereby fulfil the commitments undertaken by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of Parties to the Treaty.
2. The decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference constitute a single integral undertaking. This integrality should be maintained and respected.
3. The Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The international community should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
4. At the Cartagena summit meeting, the heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistent with the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, called upon all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil the commitments they have undertaken in their entirety, inter alia:
 - (a) The achievement of universality of the Treaty;
 - (b) The conclusion of legally binding instruments to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
 - (c) A ban on fissile materials and other nuclear devices for weapon purposes;
 - (d) The elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which must be accorded priority;
 - (e) The establishment of nuclear-free zones;
 - (f) The unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties without exception.

5. Significant progress has been achieved in recent years in disarmament: inter alia the conclusion and the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; adoption and the commencement of the preparatory process for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, adoption of an amended Protocol II and Protocol IV of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; the conclusion of the treaties on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty) and in Africa (Pelindaba Treaty), which effectively mean that the entire southern hemisphere is covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones; and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. However, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries continues to believe that many important and significant tasks remain ahead of it, particularly on the shaping of the future agenda for nuclear disarmament.

6. The purpose of the upcoming meeting of the Preparatory Committee would be to consider ways to promote full implementation of and universal adherence to provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to make recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. The Preparatory Committee meetings should make substantive contributions, taken into account by the 1995 decisions on "Strengthening the review process" and "Principles and objectives" in order to enable the Review Conference to evaluate the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and identify the areas in which further progress should be sought in the future.

7. The preparations for the 2000 Review Conference provide an opportunity for the realization of the objectives enshrined in the Treaty. For the successful outcome of the Review Conference substantive preparation should be made by the Preparatory Committee meetings in order to elaborate rolling texts to be submitted for consideration by the Conference, as basis for its final document. In this context, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries offers its preliminary views, which consist of the following:

Universality

8. The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty.

9. The Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conference should consider ways and means to achieve the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities.

Non-proliferation

10. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The international community should make all the possible efforts to prevent the

proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament

11. States parties should agree on a recommendation to the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would take into account the proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt flexible approach, taking into account their commitment, as stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

12. The nuclear-weapon States should express their commitment to undertake a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of progressive and deep reductions of nuclear weapons, and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons.

Security assurances

13. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. In this regard, there is no objection, in principle, in the Conference on Disarmament and the General Assembly, to the idea of an international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Hence, the States parties should agree to negotiate, in the Preparatory Committee meetings for the 2000 Review Conference on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally adopted by the 2000 Review Conference as a protocol annexed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Fissile material

14. States parties support the establishment of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament. It would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.

Safeguards

15. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are an essential element in providing a guarantee that States are complying with article III undertakings. All States parties that have not yet done so should sign without delay the safeguard agreements required by article III of the Treaty.

16. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source of special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope safeguards.

17. Nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

18. The inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination must be reaffirmed by all nuclear and non-nuclear States parties alike. It is also essential that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties be fully guaranteed. States parties should reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of article IV of the Treaty.

19. Unilaterally enforced restrictive measures, beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.

20. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking into account particularly the needs of developing countries.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

21. Taking into account article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the decision of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference relating to the establishment of such zones, States parties should express support on measures taken by a State party or group of States parties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and support proposals to establish these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regimes and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States parties should welcome the initiative taken by States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

22. The States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation.

including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.

The resolution on the Middle East

23. It has to be noted that no progress has been achieved in the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Preparatory Committee meetings should follow up on the implementation of the provisions of this resolution with a view to reporting to the Review Conference on the progress achieved in this regard.

24. Since the adoption of the resolution, new realities have emerged in the Middle East pertaining to adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. With the latest accession of United Arab Emirates, Djibouti and Oman, it is now a reality that all States of the Middle East have become parties to the Treaty with the exception of Israel.

25. The Movement of Non-Aligned States are convinced that the implementation of this resolution should proceed as soon as possible with a view to enhancing the universality of the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime as a whole. In this regard, the meetings of the Preparatory Committee should welcome the latest accessions to the Treaty and call upon Israel to accede to it without further delay as well as to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

26. Furthermore, the Preparatory Committee should recommend ways and means to get all parties directly concerned to engage seriously in undertaking practical and urgent steps required for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, a zone which should be freely arrived at among regional States.

27. The depositary States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have a special responsibility in this regard, as co-sponsors of the draft resolution submitted for adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and as the resolution constitutes part and parcel of the package of the outcome composed of three decisions and the resolution.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

28. Taking the above into consideration, the upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee could be organized as follows:

(a) On substantive discussions, attention should be focused on issues of concern to all States parties, utilizing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the decisions taken in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as the yardsticks in determining the objectives to be achieved by the Review Conference to be held in the year 2000. It should be discussed in a structured, coherent and focused manner in order to obtain the maximum results as to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference;

(b) The formulation of recommendations to be considered by the Review Conference shall not replace the evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since the Conference in 1995. The States parties to the Treaty should start negotiations in the first Preparatory Committee on a rolling text on the implementation of all the articles and preamble of the Treaty;

(c) States parties of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons welcome the participation of non-governmental organizations, which could also make a positive contribution towards the attainment of these objectives.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/12
14 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER TWO

Submitted by Mongolia

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

1. Mongolia welcomes the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world, as well as the ongoing efforts to establish new zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region or subregion concerned, which would promote global and regional peace and strengthen international security. In this respect, full support should be given to the creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the Central Asian subregion, by the time of the Review Conference in the year 2000, as expressed in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.
2. Creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones within the boundaries of individual States complements the obligations undertaken by the States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, by prohibiting within such zones deployment of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, the dumping of radioactive wastes and the like, they expand the geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones.
3. Mongolia's declaration of its territory as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992, which has been welcomed and supported by all nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, has demonstrated that the creation of such zones within the boundaries of single States (single-state zones) is, in general, politically acceptable. For nuclear-weapon-free zones to be effective, irrespective of their geographical scope, they should be based on international agreement(s), have clearly defined rights and obligations of parties to such agreement(s), a system of verification and control to guarantee compliance with the obligations derived from such status, the assurances from parties to the agreements, etc. Therefore, in order for single-state zones to have equal legal basis with other zones, the objectives, purposes and principles, as well as the status of the zones, should be clearly defined in international agreement(s), taking duly into account the experience of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the specifics of single-state zones. The interests of neighbouring States should also be duly taken into account.

4. Bearing in mind the important role that single-state zones could play as concrete disarmament and confidence-building measures in widening the geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and thus contributing to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mongolia believes that the Preparatory Committee should focus specifically on this question and contribute to developing practical procedures in institutionalizing such forms of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States concerned with their neighbours as well as the nuclear-weapon States.

5. The delegation of Mongolia is prepared to enter into consultations on this and related issues with other members of the Preparatory Committee and other participants of the sessions of the Committee.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/13
14 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER ONE

Submitted by Norway

1. Norway believes there would be merit in voluntary measures to increase transparency on holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Transparency as a confidence-building measure should apply to all States with a nuclear capability, but for obvious reasons the primary burden would fall on the nuclear-weapon States.
2. A fundamental prerequisite for transparency would be the application of consistent and strict standards of accounting and secure handling and storage procedures for fissile material at the national level.
3. Voluntary transparency measures of this character would facilitate negotiations on a "cut-off" treaty as well as any future talks on nuclear disarmament.
4. The following measures could be considered for successive implementation:
 - (a) All nuclear-capable States would submit information on their stocks, if any, of weapons-grade fissile material;
 - (b) Cooperative international measures would be put into place in order to clarify and confirm these declarations;
 - (c) The nuclear-weapon States, or any State that submits information on holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, could permit inspection of such holdings. The aim would be to ensure that the inventory in storage can only be withdrawn for non-weapons purposes;
 - (d) Agreed monitored net reductions from stockpiles could be envisaged.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/14
14 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER TWO: ARTICLE VII

Submitted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

Proposed elements for inclusion in the report of
the Preparatory Committee on its first session

1. Significant progress has been made since 1995 in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia and in the growth of support for nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions.
2. In realization of the recommendations contained in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are especially pleased to note that on 28 February 1997 they formally endorsed, in the Almaty Declaration, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. This joint action, following earlier initiatives by several countries of the region, is indicative of the importance the States of Central Asia attach to article VII of the Treaty and paragraphs V to VII of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
3. As the States parties to the Treaty prepare for the next Review Conference in the year 2000, the Preparatory Committee takes positive note of this development.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/15
14 April 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: CHINESE/ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

PROPOSALS FOR INCLUSION IN THE REPORT ON THE FIRST SESSION
OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE
OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Submitted by China

The Chinese delegation would like to present the following proposals for inclusion into the recommendation section of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference on its first session:

Cluster one: implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances

1. The nuclear-weapon States concerned should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence; the States with large nuclear arsenals should further reduce drastically their nuclear stockpiles, and should destroy the removed nuclear warheads rather than simply transfer them from deployment to storage.
2. All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and to conclude a legally binding international instrument to that effect.
3. No country should develop and deploy space weapon systems or missile defence systems that undermine strategic security and stability.
4. States with nuclear weapons deployed outside their borders should bring all these weapons home.
5. The States that have not yet signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty are urged to do so at an early date, and all signatory States should strive to achieve the early entry-into-force of the Treaty.
6. All States should work for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

7. An international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons under effective international supervision should be concluded through negotiations with the participation of all States.

8. All States should support the efforts of the non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at and in the light of the actual conditions of the regions concerned. All nuclear-weapon States should pledge their support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect their status and undertake corresponding obligations.

9. All nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude, at an early date, legally binding international instruments to that effect.

Cluster two: implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards

10. In order to facilitate the Treaty's function in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, the States parties should continue to support the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

11. All States parties should support the IAEA programme for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system. The nuclear-weapon States should apply those measures provided for in the model protocol that each of them identifies as capable of contributing to the nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

Cluster three: implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy

12. All States parties should make every effort to facilitate international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States that are in a position to do so should assist the developing countries to master technologies for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

13. All States parties should ensure that measures taken by them to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation would facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of the legitimate rights of the developing countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those restrictions on the transfer of technologies for peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are beyond safeguards required under the Treaty should be removed.

Universality of the Treaty

14. All States parties should strive for the achievement of the universality of the Treaty.

Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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14 April 1997

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New York, 7-18 April 1997

DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES AGAINST THE
USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Submitted by Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan

1. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, non-nuclear-weapon States have expressed concern for their security. They have consistently called for the conclusion of a legally binding instrument, providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. To secure such security assurances and to conclude an international legal instrument thereon is a legitimate aspiration of non-nuclear-weapon States.

2. Paragraph 20 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (resolution S-10/2), the first special session devoted to disarmament, underscores the importance of effective measures of nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war as deserving the highest priority among measures of arms limitation and disarmament. In paragraphs 32 and 59 of the same document the Assembly also reaffirms the need for effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

3. Following the demise of the cold war, positive changes have taken place in the international political climate. As a consequence, the world has witnessed the conclusion of a number of significant arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The precedents of the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the beginning of the process of nuclear disarmament by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, and the measures taken by other former Soviet Republics in the framework of complete nuclear disarmament demonstrate clearly that nuclear disarmament is not only within the realm of practical implementation, but it is also achievable in the foreseeable future, if only the political will exists. Apparently, less reliance is now being placed by nuclear-weapon States on the role of nuclear weapons. This process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons should be continued and carried forward as a significant step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

4. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on many occasions has reiterated the belief that, in order to be effective and lasting, the approach towards international security should be non-discriminatory and balanced and should seek security for all through total nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework, elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and progressive measures of reduction of conventional arms. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries also stressed that security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States can contribute positively to addressing some of the dangers inherent in the presence of nuclear weapons and has urged the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate, as a matter of priority, an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to undertake negotiations for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

5. The delegations of Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan attach the utmost importance to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. It is their conviction that the only completely effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lie in the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and complete elimination of these weapons. Existence of nuclear weapons in itself constitutes a threat to international security and a factor which encourages proliferation. For this reason, and pending the achievement of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures and arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against these weapons, and to elaborate measures and arrangements which can contribute positively towards achieving the most effective regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects.

6. These States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe that international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should cover both negative and positive security assurances.

7. They consider that, by renouncing voluntarily their nuclear option, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have a legitimate right to receive legally binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

8. In this context, these States parties consider that the unilateral declarations made by the four nuclear-weapon States, and Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 and 984 (1995) of 4 November 1995 on security assurances have not fulfilled the requirements of non-nuclear-weapon States.

9. In May 1995, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted decisions on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on the extension of the Treaty, and a resolution on the Middle East.¹ In the decision on principles and objectives, the Conference, inter alia, called upon the States parties to consider further steps on security assurances that could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

10. Accordingly, the delegations of Kenya, Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan consider that the time is now opportune to negotiate and conclude a protocol to the Treaty, providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

11. These States parties, therefore, propose a draft protocol to the Treaty on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The text of the protocol is annexed hereto.

12. These States parties are of the view that all States parties to the Treaty must take effective measures for nuclear disarmament, a ban on fissile materials, conclusion of an international legally binding instrument providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and universal adherence to the Treaty. With regard to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, these States parties urge the Preparatory Committee to address this issue in a substantive manner with a view to concluding a protocol to the Treaty, not later than the time of the convening of the 2000 Review Conference. The draft protocol, proposed by the States parties, will provide a basis for negotiations at the Conference or at the Preparatory Committee meetings.

13. These States parties firmly believe that conclusions of such a protocol on security assurances constitute an essential element of an effective regime of the Treaty, will strengthen the Treaty and will contribute to the success of the 2000 Review Conference.

Notes

¹ 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I
(NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex.

ANNEX

Draft protocol on security assurances to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world,

Convinced that the only effective and credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of these weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to devise effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that the principle of undiminished security for all States requires effective measures of such legally binding security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States,

Considering that, by renouncing voluntarily their nuclear option, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have the legitimate right to receive legally binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them,

Recalling the three decisions and one resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,* including the decision on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which, inter alia, called upon the States parties to take further steps on security assurances that could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument,

Reaffirming their undertaking to observe strictly the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which the present protocol is an annex, and their determination to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty by all States,

Bearing in mind the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States,

Recalling their obligations to refrain, in their mutual relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political

independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

I. DEFINITIONS

The terms 'nuclear-weapon States' and 'non-nuclear-weapon States' referred to in the present protocol refer to the definitions given in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

II. BASIC OBLIGATIONS

1. In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, each State party to the Treaty undertakes to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against another State party, its territorial integrity and its political independence.
2. The nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

III. MEASURES IN CASE OF NON-COMPLIANCE

1. Any State party that has reason to believe that there has been or is likely to be a breach of the obligations of States parties arising from Article II of this instrument may request an urgent meeting of a Conference of States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or that of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to preventing such a breach, or redressing the situation arising therefrom.
2. In the case of a nuclear aggression or a threat of such an aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Conference of States Parties should provide to it the necessary help and assistance.

IV. DURATION

The duration of the present protocol shall be the same as that of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which the protocol is an annex.

V. ENTRY INTO FORCE

The present protocol shall enter into force for the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instrument of ratification with the depositary Governments of the Treaty.

Notes

* 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I
(NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/16/Corr.1
16 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES PARTIES AGAINST THE
USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Submitted by Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan

Corrigendum

1. The titles of document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/16 should read as above.

2. Paragraph 5

The first sentence should read

5. The delegations of Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan attach the utmost importance to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

3. Paragraph 10 should read

10. Accordingly, the delegations of Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan consider that the time is now opportune to negotiate and conclude a protocol to the Treaty, providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/17
15 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER ONE

Submitted by Ireland

Nuclear disarmament

1. The reaffirmation on the part of the nuclear-weapon States (joint statement of 8 April 1997 to the Preparatory Committee at its first session) that they will continue to pursue, with determination, systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, is to be welcomed.
2. In order to reinforce confidence in the incremental approach to nuclear disarmament while helping to ensure the continuance of the improved international security environment created by the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this reaffirmation should now be elaborated.
3. In the context of the "systematic and progressive efforts" that they have agreed to pursue, the nuclear-weapon States should set out their perspective on the future steps they will take to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32
15 April 1997
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER THREE

Submitted by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

Proposed elements for inclusion in the report of the
Preparatory Committee on its first session

As noted in the report of Main Committee III of the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was adopted by consensus, there have been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences have resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. The Preparatory Committee reiterates the 1995 Conference's call upon all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes in those affected areas.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/19
15 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER TWO

Submitted by Belarus

proposed language for inclusion in the report of the Preparatory
Committee on its first session

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

1. States parties recognize the growing importance and interest in utilizing the provisions of article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which affirms the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
2. States parties are convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, particularly in regions afflicted with international conflicts, enhances regional and global peace and security and, being conducive to the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, is in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.
3. States parties confirm that nuclear-weapon-free zones constitute an important disarmament measure instrumental in strengthening the international non-proliferation regime in all its aspects.
4. States parties are inspired by the signing of the Treaties establishing the South-East Asian and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones which, together with such zones already in existence for Antarctica, the South Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean, henceforth make the entire southern hemisphere free of the development, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer or use of nuclear weapons.
5. States parties call upon all the parties concerned to initiate and continue, wherever appropriate, bilateral and multilateral consultations aimed at promoting an exchange of views among them on the possible ways and means of enhancing their contribution to the process of regional and global nuclear disarmament and strengthening international peace and security through concerted efforts.

6. States parties are encouraged by the historic events of the past few years that enhanced the atmosphere of trust, mutual respect and partnership among European States as well as the prerequisites for practical implementation of the idea to free the world of nuclear weapons, in particular the withdrawal of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and thus from the entire Central and Eastern European region, ranging from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.
7. States parties acknowledge the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their effective efforts in nuclear disarmament and consistent fulfilment of their obligations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles, and note with satisfaction the significant contribution of those States to the strengthening of the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security.
8. States parties underline the importance of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones on the European continent as instrumental and conducive to further disarmament and welcome the intention of the interested European States to continue consultations aimed at further consolidating conditions conducive to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the centre of Europe.
9. States parties welcome the numerous previous endeavours and continuous post-war efforts by some Central and Eastern European States aimed at promoting the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on their continent as a goal that is in complete consonance with the United Nations aspiration for a world without nuclear weapons.
10. States parties call on the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any actions that might jeopardize the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and damage the perspectives of establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones. It further calls on them to assist in every way possible in the establishment of such zones and to give early consideration to the signing of the relevant protocols once concluded, including undertaking to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty establishing the zone.
11. States parties urge all States of the region to declare solemnly that they will refrain from resorting to any means of acquiring nuclear weapons and from permitting the stationing on their territories or territories under their control of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
12. States parties request the Secretary-General to assist the countries concerned as well as all interested member States in their efforts to open up consultations and negotiations on issues related to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in new regions.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/20
16 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER ONE: NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Submitted by Sweden

Proposed elements for inclusion in the report of the
Preparatory Committee on its first session

1. The States parties take note of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 and in particular the unanimous conclusion by the Court that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".
2. The States parties welcome the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States in their joint statement of 8 April 1997 to the Preparatory Committee at its first session that they would continue to pursue, with determination, systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. The States parties underline the importance that the specific steps to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their commitment be identified and fully implemented.
3. The States parties welcome the report of the Canberra Commission, which proposes a series of concrete measures towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, and commend the report for consideration in international disarmament forums with a view to exploring the possibilities of implementing the steps set out in the report.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/21
16 April 1997
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND
RUSSIAN

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

**PROPOSALS FOR INCLUSION IN THE REPORT OF THE FIRST SESSION
OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE
OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

Submitted by the Russian Federation

Sharing the provisions contained in the document of the five nuclear-weapon States (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/2), the delegation of the Russian Federation proposes to include into the recommendation section of the report of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference on its first session the following proposals, also presented among others in its statements in the Preparatory Committee:

(a) That an exchange of views and negotiations be begun on a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States, taking into account the specific nature of their nuclear arsenals and possibly with a certain asymmetry of commitments;

(b) That the nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon States should be stationed only within their own territories.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/22
16 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

PROPOSALS FOR INCLUSION IN THE REPORT OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE
PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Submitted by South Africa

A. Substantive and procedural issues

1. The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons attending the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirm the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.¹

B. Recommendation for the second session of the
Preparatory Committee

2. The Preparatory Committee recommends that time should be allocated at its second session for further debate and consideration of proposals that have been made on the issue of security assurances.

C. Draft recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference

3. The States parties reaffirm the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

Universality

4. The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should redouble their efforts to achieve the universality of the Treaty because the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament are one of the cornerstones of international peace and security.

Non-proliferation

5. The States parties should continue to promote the full implementation of the non-proliferation obligations of the nuclear-weapon States and of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

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6. The States parties should continue to take active measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the technologies, material and equipment that are used to produce those weapons, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially by developing countries.

Nuclear disarmament

7. The adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be recorded as one of the goals of the States parties that has been accomplished. Paragraph 4 (a) of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should be replaced by a call on the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and for its signature and ratification by all the members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

8. The nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the Russian Federation and the United States of America, should be called upon to continue in the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally and to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective control. The other nuclear-weapon States should join in the process of structured and verified nuclear disarmament as soon as possible.

9. (a) The States parties should welcome progress made in the negotiation of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein.

OR

(b) The States parties should renew the call contained in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament for the Conference on Disarmament to commence immediately negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein. All States parties who are members of the Conference should work actively to achieve that goal.

10. The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to deliberate and agree upon the practical steps and negotiations required for a programme of systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate totally nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

11. The States parties welcome the considerable progress in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones since the 1995 conference, and especially the establishment of the zones created by the Treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok. The States parties furthermore renew their call for the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among

the regions concerned, especially in regions where they do not exist, such as the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia.

Security assurances

12. The States parties recommend that the 2000 Review Conference endorse an instrument on legally binding security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty for signature and ratification.

Notes

¹ 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), decision 2.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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16 April 1997

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First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

**DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REPORT OF THE FIRST SESSION OF
THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF
THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

Submitted by the European Union

For insertion in part B of the Chairman's paper

Universality

Recognizing that universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent requirement, the States Parties recommend that all States Parties should make every effort to achieve this objective, and call on all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded facilities.

Cluster one

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The States Parties welcome the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, and call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date

[If the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force:]

, in particular those States upon whose adherence entry into force of the Treaty depends.

Fissile material cut-off treaty

The States Parties call on all States to sign and ratify a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention, negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament of 24 March 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein.

Disarmament

Welcoming the progress towards nuclear disarmament made by the nuclear-weapon States, including that made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, the States Parties call for further progress towards global reductions of nuclear arsenals. The States Parties urge the nuclear-weapon States to continue the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons, and all States to continue the determined pursuit of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective control.

[If START II has not been ratified:]

The States Parties call for the START II Treaty to be ratified as soon as possible and for an early start to negotiations on a START III treaty.

[If START III has not been concluded:]

The States Parties call for an early conclusion to negotiations on a START III treaty.

The States Parties welcome efforts by the group of seven major industrialized countries and the Russian Federation to address the issue of management of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

[If the Chemical Weapons Convention is not universal:]

The States Parties urge all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

[If negotiation on a Biological Weapons Convention verification protocol is not completed:]

The States Parties urge the Ad Hoc Group of the States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to complete as soon as possible a legally binding verification and compliance regime for the Treaty.

The States Parties recommend that all regions make major reductions in their level of conventional arms, as has been done in Europe on the basis of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

Considering nuclear-weapon-free zones to be important complementary instruments to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the States Parties welcome advances made in this field, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned.

Security assurances

The States Parties welcome the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 4 November 1995, as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances as important developments in this field. The States Parties recommend that further steps be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which could take the form of an international legally binding instrument. The States Parties recognize that treaty-based security assurances are available to parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones through the signature of the relevant protocols to such zones by the nuclear-weapon States. The States Parties recommend that concerned States that have not yet signed and ratified these treaties do so as soon as possible, and thus bring into effect those security assurances.

Cluster two

Safeguards

The States Parties call on all States and other Parties with INFCIRC 153-type agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency that have not yet done so to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into effect additional safeguards agreements using the model protocol containing the Programme "93+2" Part 2 measures as a standard text.

The States Parties call on States with voluntary offer safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency that have not yet done so to conclude additional agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency incorporating measures that they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the protocol, when implemented with regard to that Party and as consistent with its obligations under article I.

The States Parties call upon States with INFCIRC 66-type safeguards agreements to negotiate and bring into effect agreements providing for the implementation of Programme "93+2" Part 2 measures.

Nuclear materials accountancy and physical protection

The States Parties recommend that each Party with nuclear materials on its territory maintain and improve its own arrangements for nuclear materials accountancy, safety and physical protection, applying the appropriate internationally agreed standards.

Export controls

The States Parties recommend that transparency in nuclear-related export controls should continue to be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty.

All States Parties should exercise their responsibility to control nuclear-related exports whatever their destination and give full effect to their commitment that new supply arrangements should require, as a necessary

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precondition, acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency's full-scope safeguards and international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The States Parties call upon Parties that have not yet done so to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.

Nuclear smuggling

The States Parties call upon all Parties that have not yet done so to adhere to the Programme of Action on Illicit Trafficking as agreed by the group of seven major industrialized countries and the Russian Federation. States Parties that have adhered should continue to work to promote international cooperation between the relevant national agencies with a view to preventing such smuggling.

Cluster three

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

The States Parties recommend continued international cooperation in this field, taking into account, in particular, the needs of developing countries.

The States Parties call on all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety at the earliest possible date.

The States Parties urge early conclusion of a convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management, and call on all States to sign and ratify that convention at the earliest possible date.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/25
16 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER THREE

Submitted by Canada

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

1. Canada believes in the right, as set out in article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of all parties to the Treaty to engage in and to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy - a right to be exercised in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

2. Through bilateral agreements, Canada is engaged in the full range of cooperation as called for in paragraph 15 of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,¹ including the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information, for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Nuclear safety

3. In accordance with paragraph 18 of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Canada is working actively to bring into force in Canada the provisions of three recently agreed international agreements: the International Atomic Energy Agency Convention on Nuclear Safety, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships (the INF Code), and revised IAEA recommendations on transportation of nuclear fuel.

4. Canada would welcome the approval of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

Support to the International Atomic Energy Agency

5. As a significant donor to the Technical Cooperation Fund, Canada believes that there can be no further growth in the Fund unless the donor base is broadened. It strongly urges all States in a position to contribute their fair share to do so.

Notes

¹ 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex, decision 1.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/28
21 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTER THREE: CONVERSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS
TO PEACEFUL USES

Submitted by Norway

1. Norway welcomes the many steps that have been taken by some of the nuclear-weapon States to destroy great numbers of nuclear weapons over the past few years. Due credit should be given to all efforts to reduce levels of nuclear armaments. As the delegation of Norway pointed out in its general statement on 8 April, the disarmament process poses new challenges to countries concerned, what has been called the management of disarmament.
2. The disarmament process requires strict procedures for safe handling, storage and disposal of sensitive nuclear materials as well as safe management of radioactive contaminants in compliance with high standards of environmental protection and nuclear safety.
3. Norway believes that continued international attention needs to be directed at the problems of safety and contamination related to former nuclear operations, inter alia, associated with discontinued nuclear weapons programmes.
4. At this first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the delegation of Norway would like to recall the progress made during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in finding common ground on the issue of conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses. In particular, Norway would reiterate the call made in an agreed draft document of Main Committee III of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference addressed to all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving assistance as may be requested in affected areas, taking into account efforts that have been made or that are planned to be implemented at the regional and national levels in this regard.
5. In this context the delegation of Norway would like to mention a trilateral declaration, signed in Bergen on 26 September 1996 by the Ministers of Defence of the Russian Federation, the United States of America and Norway concerning Arctic military environmental cooperation (AMEC). In addition there are further bilateral Russian-Norwegian cooperative efforts under way to deal with the dismantling of Russian nuclear submarines. The delegation is pleased to note

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that there is substantial multilateral interest in taking part in this programme.

6. The delegation of Norway believes that this subject, the conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses, requires more focused attention at the next and succeeding sessions of the Preparatory Committee in order to note the progress made, to promote ongoing efforts and to identify areas where further international cooperation could be of use, with a view to presenting the best possible position on this important issue at the start of the 2000 Review Conference.

7. The delegation of Norway would like to support the proposal made on the same issue by the delegation of Kyrgyzstan on behalf of the States that have signed the Almaty Declaration.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/29
21 April 1997

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

**VIEWS ON A "ROLLING DOCUMENT" FOR THE STRENGTHENED
TREATY REVIEW PROCESS**

Submitted by Canada

The basis for the present working paper is contained in the Canadian statement in the meeting of the Preparatory Committee on the strengthened process. Essentially it recognizes that the Preparatory Committee meetings in 1997-1999 are to consider principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. Canada considers that the strengthened review process should focus on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons itself, guided by the conclusions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. As the eventual recommendations will have to reflect an ongoing evaluation as well as developments over the next three years, Canada also considers it premature to initiate actual consensus drafting at this stage. Rather, it recommends the establishment of a "rolling document" intended to capture views, evaluations and proposals - an inventory thereof - as an evolving basis for eventual negotiations on recommendations to go forward to the 2000 Review Conference. Using the structure of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the following initial compilation of ideas are set out as a possible starting point for such an exercise.

Elements for a "rolling document"

Preamble

- Reinforcement of the core objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as set out in preambular paragraphs 2 (non-proliferation, both vertical and horizontal), 7 (cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and 8/9 ("effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament");
- Work towards the earliest possible entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (para. 10), including the implementation, if necessary, of the provisions of paragraph 2 of article XIV of that Treaty; reinforcement in all ways possible of the normative weight of that Treaty.

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Article I

- Promote the fullest implementation of this commitment by all nuclear-weapon States.

Article II

- Promote the fullest implementation of this commitment by all nuclear-weapon States.

Article III

- Continue to reinforce the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system;
- Promote the ongoing assessment and enhancement of the IAEA safeguards system, including through the effective implementation of the "93+2" programme;
- Encourage the bringing into force of all required comprehensive safeguards agreements;
- Work to improve and reinforce multilaterally agreed, transparent and effective supply conditions for material, nuclear material, equipment and technology;
- Promote dialogue and cooperation between all States to ensure effective national nuclear export controls as well as effective cooperation between States in their implementation.

Article IV

- Guided by paragraphs 14 to 20 of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, encourage as possible cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the strict implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Article V

- Recognition that the provisions of this article are now conditioned by the provisions of article VIII, paragraph 1, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Article VI

- Note: Nuclear-weapon States, in particular, are accountable for meeting the undertaking in this article, i.e., they have an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control (ICJ Advisory Opinion); this is reinforced in the Principles and Objectives by the agreed commitment by nuclear-

weapon States to the determined pursuit by those States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons; reject efforts to make this commitment conditional to a broader context;

- Regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, see preamble above;
- Promote the negotiation of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein (para. 4 (b) of the Principles and Objectives);
- Press the nuclear-weapon States to determinedly pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons by:
 - The full implementation of START I;
 - Ratifying and implementing fully START II;
 - Quick negotiation of START III by the United States of America and the Russian Federation, coupled with a political commitment by the other nuclear-weapon States not to increase their inventories;
 - Encouraging discussions now designed to move forward negotiations among the six nuclear-weapon States after the launching of negotiations on START III;
- Encourage the nuclear-weapon States to undertake other supportive measures (e.g., verification of nuclear warhead destruction; demating; continuing reductions in weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles);
- Call upon the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their inventories of tactical nuclear weapons and to take further steps to curtail and eliminate their operational deployment;
- Seek to reinforce/complement nuclear disarmament measures with additional actions (e.g., reduction in delivery systems; commitments not to pursue development of new types of weapons of mass destruction; strengthen security mechanisms);
- Continue programmes to ensure physical security of weapons-usable fissile material;
- Promote broadest possible multilateral substantive dialogue in all relevant forums, including the Conference on Disarmament, designed to support and promote all of the above.

Article VII

- Welcome and encourage progress to develop and implement nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreements consistent with international law and internationally agreed criteria;
- Examine possible variations on this theme;
- Take further steps to reinforce both negative and positive security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Article VIII

- Maintain the integrity of the Treaty;
- Continue to strengthen the review process.

Article IX

- Promote universal adherence.

Article X

- Maintain the integrity of the Treaty.

**Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

NPT/CONF.
2000/PC.I/30
21 April 1997

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First session
New York, 7-18 April 1997

CLUSTERS ONE, TWO AND THREE

Submitted by Australia

A. Cluster One

Universality

1. The States parties welcome the eight recent accessions to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Universal adherence to the Treaty remains an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to it at the earliest date. The States parties will make determined efforts to achieve this objective.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

2. The States parties welcome the adoption and opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as an indispensable step forward on the path to nuclear disarmament, and as the fulfilment of a principal component of the decision on principles and objectives of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.¹ The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty establishes a norm against nuclear testing, which is reflected in its signature by over 140 States. All States parties aim to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date, as a demonstration of the strength of international support for the Treaty and in order to facilitate its entry into force at the earliest possible time.

Cut-off

3. The States parties renew their commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of

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the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

B. Cluster Two: articles III, IV and VII

Safeguards

4. The conclusion of negotiations on the "93+2" model protocol, and its expected adoption by the special meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in May is welcomed as a significant contribution to strengthening safeguards. Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should conclude and ratify agreements with IAEA and implement the 93+2 package of safeguards as soon as possible to help ensure that safeguards are effectively strengthened and in a cost-efficient manner. These strengthened safeguards should become the new norm for comprehensive safeguards to maximize the potential of the Treaty to provide solid non-proliferation assurances.
5. All States that do not have comprehensive safeguards agreements in place, and especially the nuclear-weapon States members parties to the Treaty, should adopt the maximum number of measures identified in the model Protocol that would help contribute to the effectiveness and the efficiency of safeguards. The undertakings by a number of such States to work towards that goal is welcomed.
6. All non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should now ensure that their commitment to the fullscope safeguards standard for new supply through practical trading arrangements is fully observed.
7. States not members of the Treaty that continue to have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities should enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA without delay.
8. Nuclear-weapon States should place permanently under IAEA safeguards all of the nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities.
9. The safeguards agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with IAEA, which remains binding and in force, should be implemented without delay. The full implementation of the Agreed Framework between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America will be an important contribution to international peace and security.

Nuclear-related export controls/transparency

10. Nuclear supplier regimes should not restrict access for developing countries to advanced technology. This would be contrary to the range of undertakings on peaceful nuclear cooperation reaffirmed most recently at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

11. The fulfilment of nuclear supplier obligations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is facilitated by an effective non-proliferation regime of which strict and transparent nuclear supply policies are an integral part.

12. The international Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation, to be held in Vienna on 6 and 7 October 1997 following the forty-first session of the General Conference of IAEA, is welcomed as a first step to improve further transparency in the operation of nuclear export control regimes. All States are encouraged to attend and participate actively in this seminar.

13. Adherence by all States to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines would be consistent with Treaty and nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty objectives of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to facilitate cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Non-member States should receive assistance and advice about the practical and legal aspects of implementing the Guidelines from members of nuclear supplier regimes.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

14. All existing zones should come into force as soon as possible, and the process of ratification of their protocols by relevant States completed.

15. States of the regions concerned, and in particular those in regions of tension, should engage in discussions on possible arrangements for additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the year 2000. This includes the Central Asian region for which there is now a proposal on the table under the Almaty Declaration.

16. Work on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be intensified as a contribution to peace and stability in the region and internationally.

17. Cooperation and coordination between States parties and signatories of existing zones under the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and

Pelindaba should be actively pursued to promote the common goals of these treaties.

C. Cluster Three: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

18. States parties reaffirm the importance they attach to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

19. States parties also reaffirm the importance they attach to the work of IAEA as the principal agent for multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and reiterate their call for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

20. States parties welcome the progress made since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in developing and strengthening the international legal and institutional framework within which the development of research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes takes place.

21. In this context, States parties welcome the entry into force in 1996 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and call upon countries that have not already done so - particularly those with nuclear installations that fall within the scope of the Convention - to sign and ratify the Convention. States parties also welcome the conclusion of the negotiations on the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. States parties note the progress that has been made towards the development of a comprehensive international nuclear liability regime and express the hope for an early conclusion to these negotiations.

22. States parties stress the importance they attach to efforts at national, regional and global levels to promote and maintain the highest standards of nuclear safety, waste management and radiation protection. They welcome the initiatives that have been taken to this end since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, held in Moscow on 19 and 20 April 1996, and the Conference on Nuclear Safety in Asia, held at Tokyo in 1996.

23. States parties note that it is in the interests of all States that the transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level waste be conducted in accordance with the highest international standards of safety and

security. They note that the transportation of such materials by sea was a matter of particular concern to small island developing States and other coastal States. A number of States in this category call upon those directly engaged in the maritime transportation of radioactive materials to provide information, consistent with safety and security requirements, about the timing, route and liability arrangements to States in the vicinity of such shipments.

Notes

¹ 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part 1
(NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex, decision 1.
